

A Sociological Perspective on the Causes of Economic Poverty and Inequality in Ethiopia

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Abstract

Both the Government (PASDEP 2006) and the World Bank (Country Economic Memorandum 2007) have identified a window of opportunity for new policies, accompanied by increased aid, to shift the country to an improved growth and development trajectory, which it is assumed will reduce the country's poverty. Each document contains a range of explicit and implicit causal explanations of Ethiopia's poverty to back up their policy proposals. However, there are no theories or conceptual frameworks to order and link the *fifty* causes of poverty adduced, explicitly or implicitly, in different places in these documents. In order to achieve a more rigorous analysis of the causes of poverty in Ethiopia we show that Ethiopia's poverty (and non-poverty) is structured and can be explored by deconstructing country-level measures into the nested meso and micro levels of Regions, livelihood systems, communities, households and people. Having mapped the poverties which contribute to Ethiopia's poverty we argue that what is required for adequate explanations is a theoretical framework for distinguishing and linking different kinds of cause and establishing the social levels at which they originate. Using ideas from critical realism and complexity science we provide such a framework and use it to order the fifty causes in the policy documents. We then use secondary data and data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey and the Wellbeing in Developing Countries Ethiopia project to add some causes not included in the policy documents and some important causes of 'non-poverty' and draw some conclusions about the complex inter-weaving of the multi-level causes of the re/pro/duction of poverty and inequality in Ethiopia. We conclude with a discussion of some policy implications.

Acronyms

CSA	Central Statistical Agency
DAG	Donor Assistance Group
DEEP	In-Depth Exploration of Ethiopian Poverty
DCOSS	Dynamic and Complex Open Social System
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
EEA	Ethiopian Economic Association
ERHS	Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HICES	Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HTP	Harmful Traditional Practices
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
WBCEM	World Bank Country Economic Memorandum
WeD	Wellbeing in Developing Countries Research Project
WMS	Welfare Monitoring Survey

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1. Introduction: the purpose and structure of the paper

Ethiopia is very poor both in absolute terms and by international standards. A similar picture emerges for most other indicators of well being including on health status, nutrition, access to infrastructure and levels of industrial capital. Moreover, Ethiopia is subject to severe shocks, with lack of rainfall causing a high risk of famine and periodic large declines in agricultural output, in addition to an array of more specific health and income shocks faced by households. This overall picture shows both very low levels of well-being and of economic capacity (in human and physical capital). (World Bank Country Economic Memorandum² 2007)

Both the Government (PASDEP 2006) and the World Bank (Country Economic Memorandum 2007) have identified a window of opportunity for new policies accompanied by increased aid to shift the country to an improved growth and development trajectory which it is assumed will reduce the country's poverty. Each document contains a range of explicit and implicit causal explanations of Ethiopia's poverty to back up their policy proposals. However, there are no theories or conceptual frameworks to order and link the *fifty* causes of poverty adduced, explicitly or implicitly, in different places in these documents.

In order to achieve a more rigorous analysis of the causes of poverty in Ethiopia we show that Ethiopia's poverty (and non-poverty) is structured and can be explored by deconstructing country-level measures into the nested meso and micro levels of Regions, livelihood systems, communities, households and people. Having mapped the poverties which contribute to Ethiopia's poverty we argue that what is required for adequate explanations is a theoretical framework for distinguishing and linking different kinds of cause and establishing the social levels at which they originate. Using ideas from critical realism and complexity science we provide such a theoretical framework and use it to order the fifty causes in the policy documents. We then use secondary data and data from the WeD project to add some causes not included in the policy documents and some important causes of 'non-poverty' and draw some conclusions about the complex inter-weaving of the multi-level causes of the re/pro/duction of poverty and inequality in Ethiopia. We conclude with a discussion of some policy implications.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide some indicators of Ethiopia's poverty. In Section 3 we present lists of the causes of poverty invoked explicitly and implicitly in the PASDEP and WBCEM, which we have clustered into six types of cause, using an inductive methodology. In Sections 4, 5, and 6 we use empirical data to deconstruct country-level poverty by Region, major type of livelihood system (agriculturalist, pastoralist, urban), type of agriculturalist community, and household type, summarising our mapping in Section 7. In Section 8 we describe our theoretical approach to understanding the causes of poverty in Ethiopia and in Section 9 we use it to produce a more nuanced and rigorous analysis of the causes of Ethiopia's spatially, socially and timeously structured poverties. In Section 10 we describe some implications for policy thinking, research, design and implementation.

2. Ethiopia's poverty

Poverty in the PASDEP³ has two elements: income poverty and non-income elements which include human development poverty and what might be called 'infrastructure poverty'. In this paper our main focus is income poverty and its causes. As we deconstruct measures of poverty at the different levels we consider poverty incidence, poverty trajectories through time, and inequality.


² Henceforth referred to as the WBCEM.

³ In the WBCEM reference is made to 'income poverty', 'other dimensions', and Ethiopia's 'long-term poverty'.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2005 GDP per capita (US\$2003) was calculated as \$97 giving Ethiopia a ranking of 153 out of 154 countries. Using a measure of GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) adjusted to take account of the cost of a basket of common items across different countries Ethiopia (2003 PPP US\$716) was ranked 148th out of 154 countries. On the Human Development Index (HDI) is ranked 169 out of 177 countries and on the Human Poverty Index (HPI) 105 out of 108 (UNDP, 2008). Thus on all four indices in 2005 Ethiopia was ranked in the last 9 among all countries with national statistics worldwide.

However Ethiopia has grown richer in recent years as reflected in GDP growth rates since 2003/4 (Fig 1).

Figure 1: GDP growth rates 2000 - 2006



Source: FDRE 2006

In 2004/5 39 % of the population were estimated as living below a (very low) national poverty line equivalent to 45 US cents per day.

‘The challenge of combating deep-seated poverty is compounded by the fact that the poverty line, while reflective of consumption patterns of Ethiopian households, is by no means generous. Apart from the top few, most Ethiopians would be considered poor by the standards of a middle income country, let alone a rich one.’ (WBCEM, 2007: 11)

Table 1: Poverty measures 1995, 1999 and 2004

	1995 % households	1999 % households	2004 % households
P0 Head count	46	44	39
P1 Depth ¹	13	12	8
P2 Severity ²	5	5	3

¹Poverty gap

²Poverty gap squared

Sources: HICES surveys 1995/96, 1999/00, 2004/5

Table 1 shows that across Ethiopia the proportions of households living below the poverty line declined between 1995 and 2004, and that depth of poverty in terms of the poverty gap and the severity of poverty also declined. However consumption poverty measures vary with seasonality and with annual rainfall⁴ so the figures must be interpreted with caution. In addition household surveys are likely to exclude the extreme poor, particularly in urban areas. Moreover, the food poverty index declined but there was no decline in the depth and severity of food poverty. The PASDEP 2005/06 Annual Report notes that

... the trend rate of decline during the last ten years ending in 2004/05 has been 1.7% and 2.6% for total and food poverty, respectively. One factor that may have contributed to the limited impact of growth on poverty reduction could be the volatility of growth itself witnessed during this period (uneven growth). A one time shock may have eroded the asset base of individual households and render them vulnerable. The major drought in 2002/03, the effect of the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict from 1998/99 to 1999/00, and the decline in coffee prices on the international market during the period may have neutralized the poverty reduction impact of growth. (FDRE 2007:7).

Measured consumption distribution is relatively equal with a Gini coefficient of 0.29; only 16 out of 126 countries had a lower coefficient. It is nonetheless significant that low coefficients mean that a considerable proportion of people live close to the poverty line with significant risks of falling below the line. Moreover, even though levels of measured expenditure inequality are low there are still significant inter-household, inter-group, inter-regional (CEM, 2007: 2) and urban-rural inequalities.

3. Fifty causes of Ethiopia's poverty in two key policy documents

In this section we use the results of a discourse analysis to identify causes of poverty invoked explicitly and implicitly in the Government PASDEP 2006 (Section 3.1) and the World Bank Country Economic Memorandum 2007 (Section 3.2).

3.1. Causes of poverty suggested or implied in the PASDEP

While the PASDEP does not provide a separate and simple discussion of the causes of Ethiopia's poverty in analysing the document we have identified a set of causes which we initially clustered inductively under six headings.

The *first* set of causes refer to the materials involved in livelihood production: natural and person-made materials and embodied human resources and liabilities. They include:

- Dependence on rainfed agriculture
- Crop failure
- Volatility in household production
- Deforestation and soil degradation
- Isolated communities with poor infrastructure
- Human diseases
- Low levels of farming human capital⁵

The *second* set of causes involve structural and institutionalised patterns of relationship:

- Household vulnerability to shocks

⁴ 'Note, however that short-run poverty varies widely from year to year in Ethiopia as a result of rainfall variability (and hence crop production), making it difficult to generalize from annual data.' PASDEP: 41

⁵ Needing education, improved health, modern technical skills, and access to information

- Insecurity of land tenure
- 'Inappropriate' institutions
- Missing governance institutions
- Missing social services
- Missing farmers' organisations
- Missing markets
- Uncompetitive markets

The *third* set of causes involve mechanisms some of which produce a set of 'poverty traps':

- The interaction of population pressures with the resource base producing a progressive deterioration of household asset bases
- Low levels of infrastructure trap people in a subsistence economy with insufficient resources to make lumpy infrastructure investments
- The low-risk/low return trap
- The 'early-childhood' trap: poverty produces malnutrition limiting lifetime potential leading to next-generation poverty
- Vicious circle of energy poverty
- Vicious cycle: HIV-poverty-HIV

The *fourth* set of causes relate to social processes

- Rapid population growth
- Life course poverty
- Inter-generational transmission of poverty
-

The *fifth* set of causes are events or accumulations of events (historic circumstances) which contribute to current poverty

- Household shocks
- 20 years of unrest before 1991
- A history of marginalisation in the case of pastoralists
- Household shocks

The *sixth* set of causes refer to ends: what people do (social action), why they do that they do (habits, goals, purposes, choices), who they do what they do with (social interaction), and the consequences of social interactions for structures and people (outcomes)

- 'Inappropriate' policies

The PASDEP is a long document within which numerous complexities and caveats are presented which cannot be considered here. The headline set of causes highlighted are the poverty traps. The authors use this causal analysis to support the argument that households and people will only be able to escape these traps if there is a 'major push' on growth.

3.2. Causes of poverty suggested or implied in the World Bank CEM

In this section we identify causal arguments and assumptions in the WBCEM and classify them under the headings originally identified from the PASDEP list of causes. This is also a long and complex document which identifies explicitly or implicitly a range of causes of 'income poverty' and 'underdevelopment' which are summarised in the following list.

1. *Material causes: natural, person-made and human resources and liabilities*
 - Geography
 - High transport costs to the sea and reliance on foreign ports
 - Challenging agro-ecological conditions: uncertain rainfall

- Increasingly eroded soil base in densely populated rural areas
 - Tropical diseases of people and livestock
 - Small landholdings
 - Undeveloped transport and communications networks
 - High malnutrition and poor childhood health
 - Lack of human capital
 - Lack of productivity growth
2. *Structural causes: institutionalised patterns of relationship:*
- High degrees of political inequality
 - Absence of the social contract necessary for private investment and effective public action
 - Insecure property rights
 - Constraints and bottlenecks to growth: market risks
 - Weak demand
 - Incomplete value chains
 - Policy uncertainty
 - Poorly-functioning markets: labour, insurance
 - Narrow financial system
 - Pastoralists – marginalised and disadvantaged
 - Difficult regional context
3. *Mechanisms*
- ‘Poverty traps do appear to be salient’ – two examples
- ‘the weather and market risks, soil erosion, small landholdings and weak market connectivity that characterize Ethiopian farming make investment in productivity-enhancing rural development a highly risky proposition, and
 - undeveloped transport and communications networks, weak demand, incomplete value chains, and policy uncertainty reduce profits and increase risks for private sector investment in urban development’ (ix/x)
4. *Social processes*
- Rapidly growing population
5. *Events and historic circumstance*
- Political, socio-cultural and economic institutions associated with autocratic government and the hierarchal society of the Imperial regime
 - Stalinist economic policies, internal social conflicts often associated with ethnic and regional tensions, political authoritarianism during the Derg era.
 - These long-term institutional problems produced a lack of investment in communications, irrigation, soil conservation, and disease management
 - Ideologically-driven fear of the consequences of education for political mobilisation
6. *Ends: choices, interactions and outcomes*
7. Top-down approach: cultures of behaviour of bureaucrats, politicians and citizens often involving a range of authoritarian practices
- Policy shocks
 - Consequences of events following the 2005 elections for development strategy

The WBCEM draws a distinction between longer- and shorter- run causes, which we will follow up on later, identifying the headline long-run causes of Ethiopia’s ‘extreme underdevelopment’ as ‘institutional’.

3.3. Social levels of poverty incidence in the policy documents

The causes of poverty identified in the two policy documents are mostly related to ‘Ethiopia’s poverty’, although there is recognition of different spatial and social levels of poverty incidence. In the PASDEP evidence of differences in income poverty between urban and rural households is presented and in the section on research it is claimed that:

The successive WMS since 1995/96, and HICE surveys, that have laid baseline information on income as well as non-income dimensions of poverty, disaggregated by region and gender, with rural-urban dimensions, enabling a better understanding of the nature and distribution of poverty in the country (FDRE 2006: 144)

There is also recognition that pastoralist poverty is worse than that in other livelihood systems.

The WBCEM also acknowledges significant differences between Regions and between urban and rural livelihoods, and within the rural between pastoralist and other rural livelihoods. They also compare poverty rates across food deficit weredas (around 61%) and food surplus weredas (40%).

3.4. Social levels of origin of causes of poverty

An important feature of the causal explanations explicit and implicit in these two policy documents is that they operate at and across different levels. For example, some are causes which originate at country-level which have (potentially diverse) ‘downward’ impacts on sub-systems; ‘inappropriate policies’ are designed at country level and implemented within the government system but this implementation process is played out differently in different *wereda* and then *kebele* contexts entering and impacting on different community systems in different ‘inappropriate’ ways. Other causes work initially at community, household and/or person levels and have ‘upward’ impacts on higher system levels. For example, the ‘decision’ of how many children to have originates at household or individual level but the cumulative effect of these decisions through time reduces land availability within community systems and more broadly at country level. Yet other causal processes meet at an interface. For example in each *kebele* the government system faces a local system of community management with its own structures, institutions, culture(s), dynamics and history. We return to the issue of the social level at which causes originate in Section 9 following some consideration of the different social levels at which poverties can be identified.

4. Deconstructing Ethiopia’s poverty: the Regions

In this section which is constrained by the availability of data, we describe some Regional differences in income. These are partially related to differences in the major livelihood system types, agricultural, pastoral and urban and we consider each of these separately in the next section. Not much faith can be placed in the data for Somali and Afar since they are Regions with large pastoralist populations about which there is little statistical information (World Bank 2005:27).

Most of the 38% of households below the poverty line in 1999 lived in the ‘Established Regional States’ and Addis Ababa since these states contain 85% of the population. Incidence of household income poverty estimated for 1999 were highest in Tigray (49%) and SNNP (48%) and lowest in Oromia (32%); the rate for Amhara was 36% and for Addis Ababa 41%. In 1999 the highest poverty incidence measures were for the two ‘emerging regions’ of Gambella (66%) and Benishangul Gumuz (54%) which have suffered periods of insecurity and conflict. Measures for Somali and Afar are generally unreliable but are currently likely to be high, particularly in Somali where there have been a series of droughts and conflict with the state.

Table 2 shows regional differences in the changes in the measured poverty rate between 1995 and 1999. There were, significant increases in the 'emerging' regions (31% in Gambella) and slight increases in Tigray, Oromia, and the cities of Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Harar. There was a big decrease in Amhara (9%) and a small one in SNNP (1%). The big decrease in Amhara Region, with more than a quarter of the population, offset increases elsewhere to produce no change overall for the whole country.

Table 2: Poverty by Region

	Popn	% of popn	1995 % households	1999 % households	Difference
Tigray	4,335,000	5.77	45	49	+4%
SNNP	14,902,000	19.85	49	48	-1%
Amhara	19,120,000	25.47	45	36	-9%
Oromia	26,553,000	35.37	28	32	+4%
Gambella	247,000	0.33	35	66	+31%
Benishangul Gumuz	625,000	0.83	49	54	+5%
Afar	1,389,000	1.85	20	43	+23%
Somali	4,329,000	5.77	08	15	+7%
Dire Dawa	398,000	0.53	47	49	+2%
Addis Ababa	2,973,000	3.96	34	41	+7%
Harari	196,000	0.26	25	29	+4%
Total	75,067,000	100	38	38	0

World Bank 2005: authors' own calculations using HICES data

Table 3 provides an indication of the volatility of consumption poverty from year to year as a result of overall and spatial changes in annual rainfall incidence.

Table 3: Population in need of food aid by region


	More than 65% of population in need (no of sites)						
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Tigray	2			18	3		
Amhara	1	1	1	10			1
Oromia	6	2	4	17	6	2	2
SNNP	2	1		1			
Somali	5	1	6	12	9	6	7
Afar	5		1	14	2	3	
Benishangul Gumuz				1			
Gambella	1		1	2	1	1	
Total	22	5	13	75	21	12	10

Source: Bevan 2006

Having established considerable differences *between* Regions in income and poverty incidence and trajectories we now establish that there are also considerable differences within Regions using an indicator of community consumption wealth (CCW)⁶ for the fifteen rural agricultural sites in the

⁶ 'The (monthly) household consumption aggregate is based on purchased items, gifts in cash and in kind, and a diary of consumption from own production' (Porter and Dercon 2007: 6). 'Consumption refers to monthly

Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (see map⁷).




Of the 15 sites 2 are in Tigray, 4 in Amhara, 4 in Oromia and 5 in SNNP. These sites are in no way representative of agricultural communities in each of the Regions, having been selected as exemplars of Ethiopia's main livelihood systems Fig 2 only applies to the ERHS sample. In this sample in 2004, on average the Amhara sites were richest, followed by the Oromia, Tigray and SNNP sites.

expenditure per adult equivalent per household in 1994 *birr* (8.5 *birr* – 1 US\$ approx)' (*op cit*: 27). There are some measurement issues related to the seasonal timing of the surveys which cannot be considered here.


⁷ This map includes 5 non-ERHS sites researched in 2003.

Fig 2: Consumption wealth measure by ERHS sites organised Regionally 2004




The point in including this figure is to compare it with Figure 3 which deconstructs the Regional averages to show the considerable variation in community wealth in 2004 in all but the Tigray sample. For example the average monthly consumption in two of the Amhara sites is twice that in one of the other sites, while in Oromia the richest community has an average consumption of 145 birr per adult equivalent compared with 62 *birr* in the poorest.

Fig 3: Community wealth by ERHS sites 20004




The poverty measures in Fig 3 are only snapshots in time. Figure 4 compares more snapshots of Community Consumption Wealth measures averaged over site and Region in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004. These all fall between 1994 and 1995, improve considerably between 1995 and 1997, and show more improvement to 2004, except for the Oromia sites.

Fig 4: Change in consumption wealth measure - sites by region



Once again these averages hide considerable differences in community wealth change between 1994 and 2004 and the volatility of measured changes along the 5 measurement points (see Annex 1 for Figures for Amhara, Tigray and SNNP). Fig 5 illustrates the differences for one Region, Oromia. Of the four sites only two showed considerable improvement while Adele Keke saw a fall in MHC of 37%. This figure shows how mean monthly consumption measures at the 5 measurement points from 1994 to 2004 changed considerably and in different ways for different Oromo communities.

Fig 5: Changes in community consumption wealth - Oromia



Source: ERHS data for Porter and Dercon 2007

The Figures in Annex 1 show that, while all the sites in Tigray and Amhara showed improvement between 1994 and 2004, though with varying amounts of volatility and improvement, two sites in SNNP were considerably poorer in 2004 than 1994.

This evidence from these five rounds of the ERHS establishes that:

- there is considerable diversity within Regions in rural community wealth as measured by consumption over a month
- the extent of growth/decline over the period 1994 to 2004 varied considerably among the fifteen sites
- the volatility with which the measures changed from measurement point to measurement point was also highly variable

One of the underlying causes of differences in average poverty incidence and trajectories among and within Regions is the structuring of within-Region livelihood systems and the relations between them. In the next section we deconstruct Ethiopia's poverty by broad livelihood system: urban, pastoralist and agricultural.

5. Deconstructing Ethiopia's poverty: differences among and within broad livelihood system types

In Sections 5.1 and 5.2.1 we use secondary data to discuss livelihood system wealth/poverty and internal differentiation in urban and pastoralist livelihood systems since we have no primary data. In Section 5.2.2 we use the ERHS data to compare community poverty incidence and trajectories among agriculture-based livelihood systems.

5.1. Urban livelihood systems

Projections from the 1994 Census for 2008 would bring the proportion of the urban population to 16.7% but it is expected that the 2007 census will reveal higher numbers and proportions than the projections. Most towns are small but the urban population is concentrated in the large cities. Addis Ababa alone represents 20% of the urban population. In 2006 there were 925 urban settlements, of which 507 or 55% had a population of less than 5,000 and 819 or 88% had a population of less than 20,000 (representing only a third (34%) of the urban population) (CSA 2006).

Statistical characteristics of the urban population reveal gender and age dimensions. Urban households include a higher proportion of women⁸ and of households with female or aged heads, more members and high dependency ratios.⁹ Female-headed households represent 33% in urban areas compared with 17% in rural areas. It is also striking that widow-led households represent 14% of the urban population.

Table 4 shows an urban income poverty incidence of 35% in 2004. This compares with an estimated rural rate of 39%. However, it is often noted that monetary aspects of poverty are particularly inadequate at providing a comparative sense of urban wealth and poverty. Regarding wealth status according to the DHS 2005 wealth index that combines information of assets, type of dwelling, source of water and availability of electricity, etc, 93% of those in the urban areas are in the highest wealth quintile as compared with only 10% in rural areas.

⁸ There are an estimated 6,382,000 women and 6,307,000 men in urban areas (CSA 2006).

⁹ Average number of elderly is 0.3 in urban as compared with 0.2 in rural areas, and the dependency ration is 1.0 in urban and 1.4 in rural areas.

Table 4: Urban poverty incidence 1995, 1999, 2004

		1995 % households	1999 % households	2004 % households
Urban	P0 Head count	33	37	35
	P1 Depth	10	10	8
	P2 Severity	4	4	3

¹Poverty gap²Poverty gap squared

Sources: HICES surveys 1995/96, 1999/00, 2004/5

Table 4 shows that measured urban poverty incidence increased from 33% in 1995 to 35% in 2004, although the depth and severity of the poverty decreased. Inequalities in urban areas also increased significantly between 1995 to 2005. The Gini coefficient in urban areas increased from 0.34 in 1995 to 0.38 in 2000 to 0.44 in 2005 whereas it remained the same in rural areas (FDRE 2006). Urban inequalities are much greater than rural one and have increased more rapidly. Urban destitution is a more salient and pervasive feature than rural destitution, where community safety nets provide some security in normal times, though they may break down in times of stress.

There are significant differences both *between* urban areas and *within* towns and cities. A study on poverty incidence in 10 major towns shows higher than average percentages in poverty in 1995 in Dessie, Mekele, Debre Zeit and Bahir Dar. In term of changes by 2000 the study suggests that poverty increased in Dire Dawa, Jimma, Addis Ababa and Harar. The highest expenditure was in Addis Ababa, Gonder and Debre Zeit, and the lowest in Jimma and Mekele (Dessalegn and Aklilu 2002:4).

The preponderant position of Addis Ababa which is about 8.5 times the size of the second largest city Dire Dawa goes without saying. Services are disproportionately concentrated in the capital city. To give just one example from health facilities and personnel 21% of hospitals and 28 % of doctors employed by the Ministry of Health were in Addis Ababa which represents only 4% of the national population (CSA 2006).

5.2. Rural livelihood systems

The incidence of household poverty in rural livelihood systems was 39% in 2004 and the statistics showed a 2% reduction in 1995 and a 5% reduction from 1999 to 2004.

Table 5: Income poverty incidence 1995, 1999, 2004

		1995 % households	1999 % households	2004 % households
National	P0 Head count	46	44	39
	P1 Depth ¹	13	12	8
	P2 Severity ²	5	5	3
Rural	P0 Head count	48	45	39
	P1 Depth	13	12	9
	P2 Severity	5	5	3
Urban	P0 Head count	33	37	35
	P1 Depth	10	10	8
	P2 Severity	4	4	3

¹Poverty gap²Poverty gap squared

Sources: HICES surveys 1995/96, 1999/00, 2004/5

One important source of variations in income and health poverty incidence in rural areas is variation in livelihood system associated with differences in ecology. In the next two sections we consider pastoralist and agriculturalist livelihood systems separately.

5.2.1. Pastoralist livelihood systems

Half the land in Ethiopia (52%) is pastoralist habitat (Markakis 2003:1). Currently over 12 million people live in the pastoral lowlands representing about 15% of the population. Ethiopian livestock 'represents by far the largest concentration of domestic herds in any one African country' (Hogg 1997:8). Regarding the regional distribution of pastoralism the World Bank Pastoral Community Development Project Appraisal Document (2003) noted that:

'Pastoralism is extensively practised in the Somali and Afar national Regional states (Regions), in the Borana zone of the Oromia national Regional state, and in the South Omo zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPR) national Regional state. Pastoralists are also found in areas of Tigray, Benishangul and Gambella Regions. These lowlands encompass almost seven million people, in excess of 500,000 km² (61 percent of the area of Ethiopia) and over eleven million animals' (World Bank 2003).

The Statement on Pastoral Development Policy issued by the Ministry of Federal Affairs¹⁰ noted:

'Pastoralists inhabit over half of the Ethiopian territory. There are at least 120 districts (*Woredas*) in all, 51 in Somali state, 29 in Afar state, 33 in Oromia state and 7 in the Southern Nations and Nationalities state. The total population of pastoralists in Ethiopia is estimated to be over 7 million'.

We have not found any representative statistics applying to pastoralist societies; here we rely on reports from the PASDEP.

'Poverty remains particularly intense in the pastoral areas, both in terms of low income and food consumption, and high in terms of the risk of sudden drops in income. Asset loss due to the death of livestock during droughts make it particularly difficult for pastoralist communities to recover from shocks. Furthermore, social indicators – whether they are literacy and education levels, or health status, are among the lowest in vulnerability, defined the country, as are the effective coverage of social services and infrastructure (FDRE 2007:191).

Although pastoralist communities are generally considered poorer, there are also significant and increasing differences within pastoralist societies. Some of these differences are *between* pastoralist societies whereas others are internal differences *within* pastoralist groups. Differences between pastoralist groups depend on a number of factors. These include the size of the group. Whereas the Somali numbered over 3 million and the Afar almost a million in the 1994 Census other groups are much smaller¹¹, with a few under 100,000 notably the Nuer, quite a few with under 50,000 such as the Anywa, Dasanech, Hamar, Nyangatom, and Suri and others with less than 10,000 such as the Arbore, Bodi, Mursi, and Tsamai. There are also differences relating to the extent of cultivation, use of irrigation and trade. Historically some groups, such as the Afar and Somali, have had an important role in trade, and the former developed a sultanate and have long been involved in irrigated

¹⁰ This is in appendix 12 of the Pastoralist community Development Project Appraisal Document (World Bank 2003).

¹¹ The Guji numbered over 480,000 and the Borana almost 160,000 in the 1984 census but they were included within the Oromo category in the 1994 Census

agriculture. Along the Omo and Wayto valleys a number of small agro-pastoralist groups such as the Dasanech, Mursi, Tsamay and Hor have been involved in flood retreat cultivation.

Although pastoralists have a reputation for being egalitarian, there are also significant differences within some pastoralist societies, often based on status related to being clan chiefs or leaders. The Pastoralist Community Development Project Appraisal document states:

There is a marked differentiation within pastoral society in terms of livestock holdings, the most common measure of relative wealth. There are few very rich households, with large mixed herds of camels and/or cattle, equines and small ruminants. The households that are more or less viable are those of pastoralists who can live mainly from their livestock and the agropastoralists who have enough animals to buffer against crop harvest shortfalls. Very poor agropastoral households have only a small flock of small ruminants, a couple of cattle, and uncertain harvests from rainfed crops. The destitute have access to neither livestock nor land. As a very rough estimate based on wealth/poverty ranking results in recently published reports, about 5–10% of pastoral peoples in the proposed project areas could be considered rich to very rich, about 25–35% viable, about 40–50% poor to very poor, and about 15–20% destitute.

5.2.2. Agriculture-based livelihood systems

The PASDEP identifies two types of agriculture-based livelihood system in their identification of ‘Three Ethiopias’ in terms of economic and agro-climatic zones: 1) ‘the traditionally settled semi-arid highlands’ and 2) ‘potentially productive semi-tropical valley areas’. The ‘third Ethiopia’ is found and in the hot semi-arid lowlands where pastoralist livelihood systems are found (FDRE 2007a: 13). The WBCEM (p 45) accepts the usefulness of this disaggregation but suggests that it hides considerable further diversity describing two other ways of deconstructing livelihoods. The first classifies rural households into 10 livelihood categories based on the criteria of moisture reliability and drought proneness, with a residual pastoral category with each of these divided into highland and lowland and high or low market potential (see Table 6).

Table 6: An aggregated framework of rural diversity in Ethiopia
(% of all rural households)

Agroclimatic potential	High market potential	Low market potential	All
Moisture reliable highlands	28.8	33.3	62.1
Moisture reliable lowlands	0.5	5.2	5.7
Drought prone highlands	5.8	12.7	18.5
Drought-prone lowlands	0.7	5.4	6.1
Pastoral	1.8	5.8	7.7
All	37.6	62.4	100.0

Source: Chamberlain, Pender and Yu, 2006 see World Bank 2007: 45

The second deconstruction allocates *weredas* to three types based on differences in productivity and poverty:

- Food deficit areas – *weredas* with cereal equivalent output per rural household 20 percent below the national average
- Food balanced areas – *weredas* with cereal equivalent output per rural household of 20-120 percent of national average
- Food surplus areas – *weredas* with cereal equivalent output per rural household 20 per cent higher than the national average

The purpose of these typologies is to design type-appropriate economic growth policies although they work at a high level of generality. *Weredas* frequently contain a mix of local livelihood systems generating different levels of collective wealth which can be differentiated in terms of food surplus or deficit in relation to community subsistence needs, market integration, type of crops (e.g. primary crop - *enset*, cereal for household subsistence, cash crops of various types), the relative contribution of

livestock, and relative reliance on off-farm activities, seasonal and/or longer-term migration and/or food aid. These aspects of agriculture-based livelihood systems are explored in more depth below

We now use the same ERHS data as in Section 4 but as well as grouping the fifteen communities by Region we group them into four types of livelihood system:


- Based on the production of cash food crops for sale in towns (cash food crop sites)
- Food-deficit subsistence cereal sites vulnerable to drought (vulnerable cereal sites)
- Highly populated *enset* sites (*Enset* sites)
- Subsistence plus international cash crop sites (international cash crop sites)

Table 7: ERHS sites by type of livelihood system and Region

	Cash food crop sites	Vulnerable cereal sites	<i>Enset</i> sites	International cash crop sites
Amhara	Debre Berhan (cereals) Yetmen (<i>tef</i>)	Shumsheha Dinki		
Oromia	Sirbana Godeti (cereals) Turufe Kecheme (potatoes)	Korodegaga		Adele Keke (<i>chat</i>)
Tigray		Harresaw Geblen		
SNNP		Do'omaa	Aze Debo'a Gara Godo Imdibir	Adado (<i>coffee</i>)


Figure 6 shows the differences in average community consumption wealth by livelihood system for the sample. The mean for the richest group of sites (cash food crops) is 116 *birr* compared with the mean of 51 *birr* for the poorest group which contains only two sites growing the international cash crops coffee and chat. It is notable that the food-deficit cereal sites have the second highest average wealth score, though this conclusion about the sample cannot be generalised more widely.

Fig 6: Community wealth by livelihood system 2004



When we deconstruct the livelihood groups (Fig 7) we again find not inconsiderable differences in collective wealth among communities with ostensibly similar livelihood systems.

Fig 7: Community consumption wealth by site - 2 004




The cross-community poverty line calculated for the ERHS sites is 44.3 *birr* per month per adult equivalent¹². We have constructed a scale for relative community wealth measurement as follows:

Extremely poor	< 44 <i>birr</i>	1 <i>enset</i> site
Very poor	45 – 59 <i>birr</i>	1 coffee site
Poor	60 – 79 <i>birr</i>	1 chat site, 1 <i>enset</i> site, 4 vulnerable cereal sites, 1 cash-food crop site
Medium	80 – 99 <i>birr</i>	1 <i>enset</i> site, 1 vulnerable cereal site
Rich	100 – 119 <i>birr</i>	1 vulnerable cereal site
Very rich	> 120 <i>birr</i>	3 cash-food crop sites

Figure 8 shows the trajectories of the community consumption wealth measure from 1994, through 1995, 1997, 1999, to 2004. The average change for all sites is an increase of 21 *birr* for a month of adult expenditure. There is a fall (9 *birr*) between 1994 and 1995, a considerable increase to 1997 (26 *birr*) and not much change 1997-1999-2004. However, the deconstruction in Fig 8 into livelihood system types shows considerable differences in the trajectories. The vulnerable cereal average steadily increases, as does the cash food crops average, apart from a big dip in 1995. The *enset* average is quite volatile; down to 24 *birr* in 1995 (an average well below the average poverty line of 44.3 *Birr*), up in 1997, down in 1999, with a considerable improvement by 2004. This pattern is similar for the international cash crop sites, though for this pair the changes are much more extreme. In 1997 they have the highest average of the four types, 22 *birr* higher than cash food crop for urban sale type. In 2004 they have the lowest average of the four types, less than half that of the cash food crop sites.

¹² This average is constructed from village poverty lines calculated according to local prices all specified in 1994 real terms. It is based on the cost the diet to achieve 2100 Kcal per month per adult, using the food consumed by the poorer half of the sample, and a minimum of “essential non-food” expenditure. The dollar a day poverty line would be calculated as 148 *birr* per adult per month. (Porter and Dercon, 2007: 6).

Fig 8: Change in consumption wealth: sites by livelihood system



Further deconstruction within livelihood system type reveals more diversity in community wealth, the change in measures between 1994 and 2004, and the shape of the trajectories of the community wealth measures.

Table 8: Cash food crops for sale in towns

	Community wealth 2004	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Sirbana Godeti, Oromia	Very rich	+59%	Steady and rise: steady to 1997, big increase to 1999, very small increase to 2004
Debre Berhan, Amhara	Very rich	+51%	Rise and fall: peak in 1997, slow decline since
Yetmen, Amhara	Very rich	+25%	Very volatile: decline to 1995, increase to 1997, decline to 1999, increase to 2004
Turufe Kecheme, Oromia	Poor	+11%	Volatile: decline to 1995, steady increase to 1999, decline to 2004

Three of the cash food crop sites were (relatively) very rich in 2004, the other was just poor. Two of the very rich sites had experienced rises of over 50%; the third, with a very volatile trajectory had a wealth measure 25% higher than in 1994. The wealth measure of the poor site was only 11% higher than in 1994, although it had been higher in 1999.

Four of the drought-prone food-deficit sites were poor, two of which have improved considerably between 1994 and 2004, though along different trajectory shapes (Table 9). The medium site had also seen a considerable improvement since 1994. The rich site had improved steadily although not spectacularly.

Table 9: Food-deficit cereal sites vulnerable to drought/famine

	Community wealth	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Shumsheha, Amhara	Rich	+34%	Steady improvement
Do'oma, SNNP	Medium	+138%	Rise and steady: good increase to 1995, small decline to 1997, big increase to 1999, steady to 2004
Harresaw, Tigray	Poor	+44%	Decline, rise, steady: Slight decline to 1995, steady increase to 1999, flat
Geblen, Tigray	Poor	+140%	Volatile: Slight decline to 1995, main increase to 1997, slight down then up
Dinki, Amhara	Poor	+62%	Steady improvement
Korodegaga, Oromia	Poor	+120%	Rise and fall: peak in 1999

There was little similarity in community wealth levels, changes since 1994, or trajectory shapes among the *enset* sites (Table 10). The medium site was extremely poor in 1995 and 1999. The poor site had steadily improved from a situation of extremely extreme poverty in 1994, while the extremely poor site started off extremely poor it rose to 'very poor' in 1997.

Table 10: Highly-populated *enset* sites

	Community wealth	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Aze Deboa, SNNP	Medium	11%	Volatile: below 1994 measure until 2004
Gara Godo, SNNP	Poor	270%	Steady improvement
Imdibir, SNNP	Extremely poor	-11%	Volatile: down to 1995, peak 1997, then decline

In 2004 the international cash crop sites were poor and very poor and were both worse off than they were in 1994 when the poor site was medium (almost rich) and the very poor site was poor. Despite growing different cash crops (chat and coffee) the shape of the wealth trajectories was similar.

Table 11: Subsistence plus international cash crops


	Community wealth	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Adele Keke, Oromia	Poor	-37%	Volatile: down to 1995, very high peak 1997, then decline
Adado, SNNP	Very poor	-26%	Volatile: down to 1995, high peak 1997, then decline

6. Deconstructing Ethiopia's poverty: households

We continue the deconstruction of Ethiopia's poverty by exploring differences household poverty incidences across the 15 sites and presenting some qualitative data from four of the sites on the social differentiation associated with differences in household wealth and poverty.

The mean proportion of households under the consumption poverty line across the sample is 0.24. This compares with the national statistics which estimate that in 2004 the consumption/income of 39% of rural households was below the (differently constructed) national poverty line. The Regional categories on the horizontal axis are ordered in terms of diminishing community consumption wealth. The average of the Amhara sites was 0.11 compared with 0.37 of households in the SNNP sites.

Fig 11: Household poverty incidence in ERHS sites 2004



Re-organisation of the sites under livelihood system categories (ordered along the livelihood system horizontal axis in terms of diminishing mean consumption wealth) shows the cash food crop sites to have the lowest mean incidence of household poverty (10% of households) and the enset sites the highest (42%) although they are not the lowest category in the community wealth measure.

Fig 12: Household poverty in ERHS sites by livelihood system 2004





Fig 9 shows that the proportion of households living below the consumption poverty line during the 2004 research month varied across the communities from 2% in two sites to over 40% in three sites with the highest incidence being 61% in the Gurage site of Imdibir Haya Gasha.

Fig 9: Incidence of household poverty organised by LHS



The consumption poverty measure does not give a sense of the way in which poverty is socially embedded in unequal livelihood structures. In the next section we present some narrative data made in four of the ERHS sites in 2004 (Bevan and Pankhurst 2007) to provide a picture of what it means to be rich and poor in these sites.

BOX 1: WEALTHY PEOPLE

From Yetmen:

The wealthiest people in the community are the merchants who buy agricultural products from the farmers for a lower price and sell it for a higher price in major towns. They have cars to transport the grain to towns and bring consumer goods to supply their own or other's big shops. Rich people in the rural part may have two or more oxen and the same number of cows and sheep, and may rent additional plots of land to increase their income. Those people who have additional skills like weavers and blacksmiths are also better off.

From Dinki:

Middle-wealth households may have some livestock - at least one cow and an ox or two, land and better access to labour. However, the richer households may have a good house, more than ten camels, at least one donkey, more than two pairs of cows and oxen with other livestock such as goats, sheep, enough labour, and at least one male and female servant.

On the other hand poor people often live miserable lives.

BOX 2: POOR PEOPLE

From Yetmen:

Poor people include those who work for a daily wage, farm labourers, those who are landless, those with no ox who sharecrop or rent their land out, those descended from a poor family, handicraft men who own no land, widows, prostitutes, those who collect and sell firewood and dung-cakes, those who make and sell *tella*, *areke*, *kolo*, bread, and those who are disabled and unable to work, especially old people with no one to look after them. The poorest of the poor are those people who are disabled and who have no supporter, but who make their livelihood by begging.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Poor households may have land but no tools or oxen preventing them from getting a good yield. Destitute work as

domestic servants or as daily labour. Ex-soldiers, unemployed youths who have completed school, and peasants without land are underprivileged groups on the one hand, and farm wage labourers and traders on the other are evidence of incipient class formation in the kebele. However, the importance of these people, except traders is low. Traders are a good example for other farmers to get involved in off-farm activities to earn additional income. Many of the destitute are leprosy victims who have no child or relatives to help them. Some of them have little or no farmland.

From Korodegaga:

There has not been a good harvest in the past ten years. Drought results in crop failure and inability to feed the household members, leading to dependence on food aid and daily labour and firewood selling. This results in intensification of poverty in all aspects of people's life. Lack of farm oxen is another handicap for the poor and destitute farmers. Due to lack of farm oxen, they are forced to rent or share-crop their farms or to share their labour in exchange for oxen with 'richer' farmers.

There are a growing number of destitute people, particularly in the two sites which are more market integrated: Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme.

BOX 3: DESTITUTE PEOPLE

From Dinki:

The community organizations do not have religious/cultural reasons to exclude the poor but their membership obligations systematically bar the poor. The poor have been increasingly excluded from *iddir* and *mehaber* since the famine period mainly due to economic factors. The destitute borrow or receive grain/food from others. Some people need the destitute to work for them. Others feel pity for them. Non-participation in *Idir* and *Mehaber* has been a typical form of social exclusion of destitutes.

From Korodegaga:

The poor are undermined by other people in their clan or the community. Poor and helpless people like me are excluded because we cannot contribute financially to social organisations. Old men who have wealth have a great role in decision-making and dispute resolution in the community. poor people have no voice in the community. Destitutes have no livestock or money; sometimes physically weak, no knowledge/skill to perform work properly, little or no food, may not be able to help family, leave organisations like *iddir*. Some depend on help from relatives, neighbours, govt. Others do daily labour or sell firewood. Two types – very poor who could change and those who don't know how to work and live with others.

From Turufe Kecheme:

What makes them destitute is poverty. They are not called to feasts, nobody asks them when ill. There are homeless and landless. The courses of destitute are that they live with the support of people. They don't have proper meals; they sometimes sleep without eating. Destitute take part in any kind of work. They view themselves as socially outcast... Destitutes are involved in clientage. ... Types of destitute: landless destitute, homeless destitute, sick but landowning and support less destitute.

From Yetmen:

Some destitutes do not have houses and even if they have it, it is poorly constructed. Destitutes do not have oxen and land. They wear torn clothes and bad clothes, and most of the time they live a life that is hand to mouth. Some of them are without *iddir*, *mehaber* and other institution. These people cannot contribute in terms of money or food, and they cannot organize a festival and feed others. ... They have the habit of presenting themselves to a festival, and eat and drink even when they are not invited. They do not care/worry with respect about people's judgment. Some live by sheltering themselves around the houses of the rich because they do not have their house. If there is any some work on daily labour, and live. And yet others serve the riches by taking contract they chop woods collectively or in groups. By pooling themselves together, they harvest and work on the agricultural activities of the riches; they arrange marriage among themselves. Some live by begging.

There is another level of deconstruction to individual poverty which we cannot consider in this paper which may be related to inequalities within households which are not themselves poor.

7. Patterns of poverty in Ethiopia

We have established that poverty can be identified at various collective levels. Ethiopia is a poor country compared with most other countries. Afar is a poor Region compared with Oromia. Mekele is a poor town compared with Debre Zeit. Urban areas are richer than rural ones and agriculturalist livelihood systems are richer than pastoralist livelihood systems. And so on. Every time we

deconstruct a ‘poor’ collectivity we discover both wealthy and poor sub-collectivities. Poverty depends on inequality in such a way that explanations of poverty must also be explanations of different levels of ‘non-poverty’ or wealth.

In the remainder of the paper we start by establishing the causes of the collective wealth/poverty of agriculturalist communities and then the causes of wealth/poverty among agriculturalist households. From there we move to an analysis of the causes of the wealth/poverty of pastoralist societies and in urban areas before considering how these different levels and systems work together to constitute ‘Ethiopia’s poverty’. Before we do so we briefly describe the theoretical framework which underpins the analysis.

8. A multi-causal multi-level approach to poverty in Ethiopia

We have developed a framework for researching the ways in which, in any country context, multi-level causes of different kinds interact and co-evolve¹³ through time to produce spatial and social patterns, dynamics and histories of poverty and wealth. The framework makes use of an Aristotelian approach to causes (Kaminska-Labbé *et al*: 2005), a critical realist approach to social research (Carter and New: 2004), and ideas from the increasing application of complexity science frameworks to the social world¹⁴.

8.1. Aristotle’s classification of causes

Aristotle identified four major *kinds* of cause: material, structural, efficient, and final. One example he provided was the building of a house. The causes involved were (1) the locally available materials – material cause (2) the organisation of the means of execution – structural or ‘formal’ cause (3) the energy used to make it happen – efficient cause and (4) the vision of what should be built – final cause. As with the house the four different kinds of cause work together in joint and sequenced combinations to produce particular outcomes. There is a growing interest among social scientists in using Aristotle’s classification in empirical analyses, particularly in organisation science/management studies where it is often associated with a complexity science approach (e.g. Kaminska-Labbé *et al*, 2006; Mitleton-Kelly, 2007)

In Table 12 we sort the causes of poverty adduced in the policy documents into the four kinds identified by Aristotle. As with all classification systems (Bowker and Star: 1999) there are some items which fit into more than one category. For example, volatility in household production is a material feature of annual and seasonal differences in weather while a particular household experience which ends in chronic poverty is an efficient cause.

Table 12: An Aristotelian classification of the causes of poverty in the PASDEP and WBCEM

Kind of cause	PASDEP	WBCEM
Materials involved in livelihood production:	Dependence on rainfed agriculture Crop failure Volatility in household production Deforestation and soil degradation Isolated communities with poor infrastructure Human diseases Low levels of human capital	Geography High transport costs to the sea and reliance on foreign ports Challenging agro-ecological conditions; uncertain rainfall Increasingly eroded soil base in densely populated rural areas Tropical diseases: people and livestock Small landholdings Undeveloped transport and communications networks High malnutrition and poor childhood health Lack of human capital

¹³ e.g. Kaminska-Labbé *et al*: 2005

¹⁴ e.g. Byrne, 1998; Cilliers, 1998

Kind of cause	PASDEP	WBCEM
		Lack of productivity growth
Structural and institutionalised patterns of relationships	Vulnerability to household shocks Insecurity of land tenure Missing governance institutions Missing social services Missing markets Uncompetitive markets Missing farmers' organisations 'Inappropriate' institutions	High degrees of political inequality Absence of the social contract necessary for private investment and effective public action Insecure property rights Constraints and bottlenecks to growth: market risks Weak demand Incomplete value chains Policy uncertainty Poorly functioning markets: labour, insurance Narrow financial system Pastoralists marginalised and disadvantaged Difficult regional context
Efficient causes: Historic circumstances or events	20 years of unrest before 1991 A history of marginalisation in the case of pastoralists	A history of autocratic and hierarchical institutions Historic lack of investment in communications, irrigation, soil conservation, and disease management Ideologically-driven fear of the consequences of education for political mobilisation
Efficient causes: Social processes	Rapid population growth Life course poverty Inter-generational transmission of poverty	Rapidly growing population
Efficient causes: Mechanisms	Poverty traps	Poverty traps
Final causes: Purposes, goals	'Inappropriate policies'	Top-down approaches Cultures of behaviour of bureaucrats, politicians and citizens often involving a range of authoritarian practices
Final causes: Choices, actions, Interactions and their consequences		Policy shocks Consequences of events following the 2005 election for development strategy

As we argued earlier an important feature of the causal explanations in the policy documents is that not only are they of different kinds, but they also originate at different levels, although they can have cross-level outcomes. Any cause can therefore be identified as being of a certain kind and originating at a particular social level.


8.2. A critical realist approach to understanding how the causes work together in particular contexts

Critical realists adopt different ontological and epistemological assumptions from both positivists and post-modernists, making a distinction between our knowledge about the world (epistemology) and the world which is the object of that knowledge (ontology). 'Social phenomena .. are existentially distinct from the processes through which we come to know them' (Carter and New: 3). In a series of books Archer has produced strong arguments to support the ontological claim that social structure, culture, and agency each possess distinct properties and powers in their own right¹⁵. For example social structures involve unequal relations and are relatively enduring providing different combinations of enablement and constraint for agents differently located in the structures. Properties of people of relevance to agency are self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality etc. Culture is about the ideational aspects of social life. To understand the relationship between structures and agency one must take account of the passage of time.

Figure 10 shows how events and interactions arise in a material and structural context. The energy that initiates actions and ideas is in people and other natural forms. The playing out of events and interactions has consequences for the materials and people involved, as well as the social and cultural structures, involving more or less change depending on context and choices.

¹⁵ This is also the case for material structures.

Figure 10: Structure-Agency model



We have adapted Archer’s model of how to analyse how social life proceeds to cast some light on how Aristotle’s kinds of cause work together. Although material and social structures (causes) are of different durations¹⁶, and may have non-linear trajectories, they are mostly relatively enduring providing the framework of constraint and enablement for the events and social interactions which are the efficient and final causes.

Another important concept for critical realists is the concept of ‘emergence’ which ‘refers to the way in which particular combinations of things, processes and practices in social life frequently give rise to new emergent properties’ (Carter and New, 2004: 7). Emergent properties are more than the sum of their constituents; they are the product of their combination and can, in turn, modify the constituents.

8.3. Complex systems

Ethiopia can be modelled as a dynamic and complex open social system (DCOSS): a structured network of relations which on some dimensions, for example statehood, are bounded, although there are networks of relations crossing the boundaries, and variations in the kinds and degrees of boundedness across and along spatial and different social dimensions. As time passes the historically cumulating actions and interactions of social actors provide the motor for the reproduction, elaboration or change of the system’s structures.

The structural elements of DCOSSES are resistant to change as they are the product of material structures which are stable for ‘durations’ which depend on the kind of structure they are and institutions: formal and informal rules socially constructed and enforced in social interactions and internalised in human psyches. The Ethiopia DCOSS is constituted by a set of smaller nested and interacting DCOSSES which are particularly important for the re/pro/duction of poverty. They include numerous sub-types of agriculture-based rural communities, pastoralist rural communities, urban communities and networks, and households.

9. The inter-weaving of multi-level multi-causes of the re/pro/duction of poverty in Ethiopia

The fact that the PASDEP and the WBCEM between them produced fifty causes of poverty is evidence of the complexity of the materials, structures, events and interactions involved in its production, reproduction and reduction at different but interacting social levels. In order to get a better understanding of how this complexity works we now identify the multi-level causes of the

¹⁶ As pointed out in the WBCEM.

wealth/poverty of agriculturalist communities, agriculturalist households and pastoralist and urban communities, combine these in a multi-level, multi-cause matrix of Ethiopia's poverty and draw some conclusions. We then refine the matrix to identify the social level of origin of the different causes to assist in the identification of entry points for different policy interventions.

9.1. Causes of the wealth/poverty of agriculturalist communities

In Table 13 we have located causes from the policy documents in terms of their levels of incidence and type of cause and added some new ones, notably in relation to community structures.

In a recent paper (Bevan and Pankhurst 2007) we identified four important socially structured 'fields of action' which, other things equal, work together to re/pro/duce patterns of wealth and poverty in rural communities: the livelihood field of action; the field of human production and reproduction; the field of community relations and management; and the field of ideas. People of different genderages and statuses play different roles in each of these fields whose unequal structures are based on power relations. The field of community relations and management is important for the allocation and use of resources which may be affected by status differences such as genderage, ethnicity, religion, occupational caste, clan and poverty itself, and for the organisation of social insurance and protection. Different family structures are problematic for different kinds of people depending on marriage and inheritance rules. And the cultural repertoires of ideas available influence people's goals and the choices they make.

Earlier we have demonstrated the importance of type of livelihood system for community wealth and household poverty. In Annex B we provide more information about what happened to livelihoods in the 15 ERHS communities between 1994 and 2003 which provides an evidence base for the livelihood conclusions in Table 13. A particularly interesting question is the extent to which community-level poverty is a cause of household-level poverty. Using ERHS data Fig 11 shows that the incidence of household poverty, measured in this case by the proportion of households not in poverty, is correlated with levels of community wealth/poverty but that the relationship varies across communities. For example, Yetmen's household poverty rate should be lower, while Domaa's is higher than expected.

Fig 11: Community poverty and household poverty 2004




TABLE 13: MULTI-CAUSES OF ETHIOPIA'S RURAL POVERTY AT MACRO, COMMUNITY, HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS

	Description	macro	community	household	individual	
Material	Livelihood production materials: natural, person-made, human resources and liabilities	Isolated communities; poor infrastructure; human diseases; livestock diseases; drought, crop failure, deforestation, erosion high malnutrition, poor childhood health; low human capital; volatility in production	Community isolation Poor infrastructure Ecology – weather and disease patterns Low levels of human capital	Community and household land shortages Household labour shortage No oxen crop failure illness Agricultural production volatility	illness, injury, childhood health	
	Human re/production materials	Households unable to grow and/or rear enough or buy enough to feed themselves	Households unable to grow and/or rear enough or buy enough to feed themselves	Households unable to grow and/or rear enough or buy enough to feed themselves		
Structural	Structural and institutional patterns of relationship	Largely pre-modern economy, society, polity; Insecure tenure; insufficient holdings; Few rural-urban linkages; Few off-farm opportunities Un(der)employment of educated youth; inter-generational and other competition for farming land; High political inequality; Difficult regional context; Unequal power relations: exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation; Limited informal social security structures; Virtual economic monopolies; Government administration influenced by party structure; Limited services particularly in marginal areas.	Type of livelihood system/field of action Type of family and household structure Ethnic/religious composition and social insurance and protection arrangements Mix of ideas	inequalities in: • relations • distributions • outcomes	Unequal land distribution; Wage labour; Weakness in negotiating asset/labour exchange terms Unequal patron-client relations between rich and poor permit exploitation; limited/no off-farm opportunities; Locally-defined unequal social status: class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, clan Locally constructed social exclusions associated with low power e.g. household head being female, young man, immigrant, from low-caste occupation, 'slave', not from dominant religion, ethnicity or clan Locally specific Interactions between livelihood and family structures Household off the local ideal-type track Household in early or late phase of household cycle Vulnerability to shocks Few/no buffers; Few/no informal social protection relationships No/inadequate formal social protection	Gendered rules related to work Gendered life cycle risks
Efficient	Events and historical circumstances	A history of autocratic and hierarchical institutions; Ideologically-driven fear of education; 20 years of unrest to 1991	Actual weather and disease events History of community circumstances and events	Household affected by one or more 'shocks' of different types whose prevalence varies by local livelihood system: Livelihood and reproductive asset shocks Human resource health shocks Social shocks related to households and government Historical events: 1975 land reform privileged the now older generation	Baby born into poor household Young men who started working life as labourers	
	Mechanisms	Poverty traps, humanitarian aid traps, conflict traps in marginal areas		Household poverty trap: poverty–low social status –low power–poverty Shock – reduction in buffers – vulnerability to further shocks – reduction in buffers .etc		
	Social processes	Rapid population growth; Life course poverty; Inter-generational transmission of poverty	Community-level population growth Inter-generational wealth transmission Life course transmission of wealth	Inter-generational transmission of poverty Household cycle poverty		
Final	Choices, preferences, purposes, goals	Authoritarian cultures and practices. Government commitment to out-of-date socialist ideologies	Top-down approach	Choices with negative consequences, particularly by more powerful household members patriarchal values and practices	Failures of personal resilience	
	Actions	'Inappropriate' policies; policy shocks; unequal regional policies; favouring investors over local people's rights, poor policy implementation;	contradictions between investment and community land rights			
	Interactions and consequences	Consequences of events surrounding the 2005 election; opposition from marginalised areas, contradiction over land with investment projects	Local impacts of policy decisions (shocks)	Spousal, intergenerational and sibling conflict	child wellbeing	

To summarise the salient points:

- *Material* causes are related to isolation, poor infrastructure, ecology and low levels of human capital.
- *Structural* causes include inequalities in relations, distributions and outcomes in four fields of action: 1) livelihood, 2) human re/production, 3) local community management, and 4) field of ideas¹⁷.
- *Efficient* causes include the particular histories of community trajectories, actual weather and disease events, poverty traps, and community level population growth, inter-generational and life course transmission of wealth and poverty.
- *Final* causes include the tendency of a top-down approach, contradictions between investment and community land rights, and local impacts of policy decision resulting in shocks such as those from fertiliser price increases.

9.2. Causes of the wealth/poverty of agriculturalist households

As we have seen however wealthy or poor the community as a collectivity internal inequality divides households into wealth categories with only a proportion being in local poverty. Here we are interested in the causes of household poverty – which households are poor and why? Table 14 uses information provided in Annex E. We also provide a brief and inadequate column on the causes of individual poverty which is an issue we will be pursuing in future.

TABLE 14: CAUSES OF HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL POVERTY IN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES			
Kind of cause	Community level causes of household poverty	Household level causes of household poverty	Causes of individual poverty
Material	Community is materially poor Community land shortage	Household land shortages Household labour shortage No oxen Agricultural production volatility	Illness, injury
Structural	Unequal land and livestock distribution Unequal patron-client relations between rich and poor permit exploitation No off-farm opportunities Locally-defined unequal social status: e.g. class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, clan Locally specific Interactions between livelihood and family structures No/inadequate formal social protection	Wage labour Weakness in negotiating asset/labour exchange terms Locally constructed social exclusions associated with low power in the community e.g. household head being female, young man, immigrant, from low-caste occupation, 'slave', not from dominant religion, ethnicity or clan Household off the local ideal-type track Household in early or late phase of household cycle Few/no buffers Few/no informal social protection relationships	Gendered rules related to work Gendered life cycle risks
Efficient	Historical events: 1975 land reform privileged the now older generation	Household affected by one or more 'shocks' of different types whose prevalence varies by local livelihood system: Livelihood and reproductive asset shocks Human resource health shocks Social shocks related to households Social shocks related to government Household poverty trap: poverty – low social status – low power – poverty Shock – reduction in buffers – vulnerability to further shocks – reduction in buffers ..etc Household cycle poverty	Baby born into poor household with malnutrition and child work consequences Young men who started working life as labourers Infertility Inter-generational transmission of poverty

¹⁷ For a detailed analysis of the four fields and their implications for poverty see Bevan and Pankhurst 2007.

Final		Choices with negative consequences particularly by more powerful household members Spousal or inter-generational conflict or competition	Failures of personal resilience Conflict between spouses, generations or siblings, divorce
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Source: Pankhurst and Bevan 2007

To summarise the major points by type of cause regarding a) household poverty and b) individual poverty:

a) household poverty

- *Material* causes include shortage of land and livestock
- *Structural* causes include unequal distribution of land and livestock, wage labour, weakness in negotiating terms of exchange, unequal patron-client relations, lack of off-farm opportunities, locally defined unequal social status and exclusions, locally specific interaction between livelihood and family structures and cycles, insufficient buffers and social protection to deal with shocks
- *Efficient* causes include a variety of locally defined shocks including livelihood, human resource health, households and government related shocks, and historical events, agricultural volatility, poverty traps and cycles relating to status, power, and households.
- *Final* causes include choices of more powerful household members and their control of resources, and spousal or inter-generational conflict or competition.

b) individual poverty

- *Material* causes include illness and injury.
- *Structural* causes include gender age rules related to work, and life-cycle risks, events relating to child nutrition and work, and young men becoming labourers or servants, failures of personal resilience and conflict between spouses or siblings.
- *Efficient* causes include babies being born into poor households leading to malnutrition and child work; young men starting working as labourers and infertility
- *Final causes* include failure of personal resilience, conflict between spouses and siblings, and divorce.

9.3. Incidence levels and causes of Ethiopia’s agriculturalist poverty

This section considers the various types of poverty at the different levels and seeks to identify at which level specific types of cause originate, and to which levels they spread or are aggregated. Table 13 presented the multi-causes of rural poverty as they produced poverty incidence at four levels: macro, community, household and individual,¹⁸. The different types of causes in terms of the four levels, where they are located and implications for other levels can be summarised as follows:

Material causes

- Causes common to all four levels relate to ill-health; this is in reality located at the individual level but has repercussions at the household, community and cumulatively macro levels.
- Isolation, poor infrastructure and ecology and poor human capital are found at a community level but have aggregate regional and macro consequences, as well as implications for households and individuals.
- Inability to grow and/or rear enough or buy enough food was identified at the macro and community levels but in reality these are aggregates of household level poverty outcomes,

¹⁸ For this analysis the urban context has been excluded and the rural analysis is based primarily on agriculturalist livelihoods.

particularly since in all communities there are those who manage well and those who are caught in poverty traps.

Structural causes

- A largely pre-modern economy society and polity is noted at a macro level but has implications through the community to the household and individual levels, for instance in the dependence on constrained social security structures.
- Unequal power relations can be seen at macro, meso (community), micro (household) and individual levels. However, these are manifested in different ways at the various levels.
 - At macro level *regional* inequalities notably in service provision particularly in marginal areas, and economic monopolies and party influence on government may be significant.
 - At a community level inequalities in land and livestock holdings and in positions of authority are noticeable.
 - At a household level inequalities are based on locally-defined unequal social status based on class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion and clan. Moreover, the poor, female heads young men, low caste individuals, immigrants are involved in unequal labour exchange relations, and may be excluded. Furthermore, those who have fallen off the ideal household cycle are less able to cope with shocks and lack social protection.
 - At an individual level, gendered rules relating to work and gendered life cycle risks compound are significant.
- Insufficient land holdings was identified at the macro level, and shortages may also be important in some communities. However household inequalities are often a function of unequal access and distribution.
- Limited urban-rural linkages is a factor at macro and community level, whereas limited off farm relations which was mentioned at the macro level is mainly significant at household level.
- Gendered work rules and risks are located at the individual level but is organised at the household level and has cumulative implications at community and sometimes macro levels, for instance in the status of female-headed households.
- Limited social protection to cope with shocks operates largely at a household level but has implications for individuals, and for community coping and ultimately the macro level.

Efficient causes

- The history of autocracy and hierarchy at a macro level has implications at a local community and household levels. For instance the 1975 land reform privileged the now older generation. However, the history of community circumstance and events may differ significantly, for instance in some communities the establishment of an irrigation scheme may have a significant impact on poverty.
- Though agricultural production vulnerability and volatility are macro level poverty outcomes, they are manifested in different ways and periods at community level and may affect households within communities differentially depending on the lack of buffers etc.
- Poverty, aid and conflict traps are macro outcomes which take on different regional and local configurations and are ultimately felt at the household level where low status and power and lack of buffers lead to specific types of households suffering more than others.
- Social processes identified at macro, community and household levels notably rapid population growth, life course poverty, and inter-generational transmission of poverty have cumulative macro implications but are generated at a household level and have serious implications for individuals within them.

Final causes

- Authoritarian cultures and practices and government policies generated at the macro level are replicated in top-down approaches at community level.
- Patriarchal values and choices by the more powerful affect individuals within households, and lead to cumulative inequalities based on gender and age at community level.

- Policies shocks have consequences at community and household level that are often felt unequally due to the ability of specific categories or type of household to resist or withstand the shocks.
- Consequences of the events surrounding the 2005 elections may affect support for government policies at a local level.
- Conflict within and between households can have serious consequences on household cohesion and the wellbeing of children.

From the above summary we can see that causes attributed at one level may in fact originate at another, but have implications or repercussions at other levels. Some causes originating at the country level such as policy decisions have 'downward' consequences on levels below; others originating at the individual level such as the number of children a woman has, have 'upward' consequences on fertility rates and population growth. Causes originating at the meso level such as community land shortage, erosion or deforestation, can have consequences in both directions, such that households face land shortage and macro aggregations in terms of loss of production or productivity. Some causes may also originate at more than one level or be blurred between two levels, a few may have origins in cultural norms such as marriage rules that do not fit with the four levels, and others such as shocks relating to international trade and humanitarian aid traps may have international origins. Table 17 identifies the level at which the causes originate.

The following comments can be made on the Table 17:

- The biggest concentration of causes seems to be located at the *household* level and then the *community* level with less at the *country* level and least at *individual* level.
- *Material* and *Structural* causes seem to be concentrated at household and community levels whereas *efficient* causes are more at household and country levels and *final* causes mainly at country level.
- *Material* causes are largely at community and household levels, with some shocks spanning both levels such as land shortage and crop failure;
- Illness originates at the individual level but can also be related to households and epidemics may have be at a community level and have country level consequences.
- *Structural* causes are also largely at household and community level; However there are also a number of structural causes related to the macro country and regional context, and genderage power relations can have consequences at the individual level.
- *Efficient* causes are common at country macro level though they make take particularly forms in communities and have implications for households in terms of shocks and poverty traps.
- Some independent variables such as vulnerability to trade shocks, and mechanisms, such as humanitarian aid traps may have international dimensions.
- Social processes such as population growth start with numbers of children a woman has which can also be related to household decision making, and has community and national implications on fertility rates and population dynamics.
- *Final* causes are concentrated at the macro level with consequences on other levels.

TABLE 17: ORIGIN LEVEL OF MULTI-CAUSES OF ETHIOPIA'S RURAL POVERTY BY TYPE OF CAUSE

	Country	community	household	individual
Material		Community isolation	Household ill health	Human diseases
		Poor infrastructure	Household labour shortage	High malnutrition
		Drought	No oxen, livestock illness	Poor childhood health
		Crop failure	Crop failure	injury
		Deforestation	Low human capital	
		Erosion	Household illhealth	
		Community land shortages	Household land shortages	
		Ecology – weather and disease patterns	Unable to grow enough or rear enough or buy enough to feed themselves	
Structural	Largely pre-modern economy, society, polity;	Unequal land distribution	insufficient holdings	Genderaged work rules
	Insecure tenure;	Insecure tenure	Insecure tenure;	Genderaged life cycle risks
	High political inequality	Few rural-urban linkages	Wage labour;	
	Difficult regional context;	Un(der)employment of educated youth	Few off-farm opportunities	
	Virtual economic monopolies	Unequal power relations: exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation;	inter-generational and other competition for farming land	
	Government administration influenced by party structure	Limited informal social security structures	Weakness in negotiating asset/labour exchange terms	
	Limited services particularly in marginal areas.	Locally-defined unequal social status: class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, clan	Unequal power relations: exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation;	Unequal power relations: exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation;
		Locally constructed social exclusions associated with low power e.g. household head being female, young man, immigrant, from low-caste occupation, 'slave', not from dominant religion, ethnicity or clan	Locally constructed social exclusions associated with low power e.g. household head being female, young man, immigrant, from low-caste occupation, 'slave', not from dominant religion, ethnicity or clan	
		Locally specific Interactions between livelihood and family structures	Unequal patron-client relations between rich and poor permit exploitation; limited/no off-farm opportunities	
		Inequalities in local community management	Household off the local ideal-type track	
	Competition and exclusions in the field of ideas	Household in early or late phase of household cycle		
		Few/no buffers; Few/no informal social protection relationships		
	No/inadequate formal social protection	No/inadequate formal social protection		
Efficient	A history of autocratic and hierarchical institutions;	History of community circumstances and events	Household affected by one or more 'shocks' of different types whose prevalence varies by local livelihood system	Baby born into poor household
	Ideologically-driven fear of education		Livelihood and reproductive asset shocks	Young men who started working life as labourers
	20 years of unrest to 1991		Human resource health shocks	Human resource health shocks
	Social shocks related to government	Social shocks related to government	Social shocks related to government	
			Social shocks related to households	

	Vulnerability to trade shocks	Actual weather and disease events	Agricultural production volatility	Infertility
	Poverty traps,		Household poverty trap: poverty–low social status –low power– poverty	
	humanitarian aid traps		Shock – reduction in buffers – vulnerability to further shocks – reduction in buffers .etc	
	conflict traps in marginal areas			
	Rapid population growth	Community-level population growth	Household decisions on number of children	Women (and men) having many children
			Life course poverty;	Life course poverty;
			Inter-generational transmission of poverty	
			Household cycle poverty	
Final	Authoritarian cultures and practices	Authoritarian cultures and practices	Choices with negative consequences, particularly by more powerful household members	
	Government commitment to out-of-date socialist ideologies		Patriarchal values and practices	Failures of personal resilience
	Top-down approach	Top-down approach		
	Inappropriate' policies;	contradictions between investment and community land rights		
	policy shocks;	Local impacts of policy decisions (shocks)		
	unequal regional policies;			
	favouring investors over local people's rights,			
	poor policy implementation;			
	Consequences of events surrounding the 2005 election;			
	opposition from marginalised areas,			
contradiction over land with investment projects		Spousal, intergenerational and sibling conflict	Child wellbeing	

9.4. Causes of the wealth/poverty of pastoralists

Similar community and household level causes of poverty and wealth are likely to operate in pastoralists areas and are not included in Table 15. In addition there are causes to be found at higher meso and macro levels which are described in more detail in Annex C and summarised in Table 11.

Table 15: Causes of the wealth/poverty of pastoralists

Kind of cause	Causes originating beyond the country	Causes originating at country level	Causes originating at livelihood system level
Material	Modern weapons Inflow of cheap weapons notably from South Sudan Encroachment of groups from neighbouring countries.		Remote and inaccessible Recurrent drought and famine at decreasing intervals leading to pastoralists with no stock Livestock production volatility
Structural	Pastoralist livelihood and cultural boundaries crossing state boundaries Persistent cross-border insecurity and conflict Alleged support to dissident political organisations from neighbouring countries	Centre-periphery relations of exclusion, marginalisation and occasional violence Poor state services Interests not politically articulated or defended	In-migrants compete for opportunities associated with economic development Increasing differentiation among pastoralists in terms of livestock holdings
Efficient		Historic government hostility to the pastoral way of life leading to alienation of land and pressure to settle	Historic loss of control of trade Food-aid dependency Poverty traps in post drought period Falling out of the pastoral economy Control of stock by elders
Final	Cross-border raids Inter-state relations and tensions	Government still hostile to the pastoral way of life (?) Government alienation of land for ranching, agriculture and wildlife parks and reserves: Alienation of best lands by investors Violent opposition from marginalised areas associated with Government control of populations resulting in loss of life, property and displacement Establishment of wildlife parks and reserves associated with evictions, threat of displacement, little or no compensation, conflict among local pastoralist groups	Leaders and richer pastoralists establishing enclosures reducing available land and water Some pastoralists choosing sedentarisation Settlement of some pastoralists increasing land-based conflict Violent opposition

A number of points are noteworthy:

- In *material* terms the remoteness and inaccessibility of pastoral areas renders them vulnerable to poverty particularly at times of drought
- In *structural* terms historical relations with the highlands have meant that pastoralists have been marginalised and their interests have not been articulated or defended
- In *efficient* terms historic hostility to the pastoral lifeway leads to land alienation and pressure to settle; the pastoral economy is also vulnerable to poverty traps relating to post-drought recovery, and socially is controlled by patriarchal elders.

- In *final* terms alienation of land by development projects, internal differences resulting from enclosures and sedentarisation, and conflict resulting from displacement, relations with the state, and competition between groups are salient features.
- Because of their geographical location mainly in the border areas, pastoralist groups are subject to poverty causes relating to external factors including the inflow of weapons and violence from across borders as well as from tensions resulting from inter-state relations.

9.5. Causes of wealth/poverty in urban communities

Table 16 summarises the main causes of the wealth and poverty of urban residents identified through a literature review summarised in Annex D. Again we have not included causes operating at community and household levels in rural areas which are also relevant in urban areas.

Table 16: Causes of urban poverty

Kind of cause	Causes originating at country level or beyond	Causes originating at community level	Causes originating at household level	Causes originating at other internal levels
Material	Loss of labour due to migration abroad but remittances leading to some improvements	Limited material capital Low levels of human capital Poor environmental conditions including missing clean water, sanitation, solid waste disposal, pollution, traffic congestion Overcrowded housing Insufficient housing Hazardous working conditions		HIV/AIDS
Structural	Unemployment and underemployment Job insecurity Dependence of poor on wage labour in the informal sector Higher (than rural) female-headed and old-headed households more likely to be persistently poor Lack of formal social protection services Missing credit markets High prices of basic goods Competition for land Insecure tenurial status	Inadequate informal social protection networks Violence and crime Vulnerability to loss of basic means of subsistence Social exclusion: beggars, street children, sex workers	High dependency rates in some households	Few urban-rural linkages
Efficient		Poverty traps Commoditisation of the urban economy Rapid population growth Becoming socially isolated		Rural-urban migration
Final	Choices, preferences, purposes, goals	Negative effects of government actions promoting urban growth with insufficient safety nets Urban crime		Migration from rural areas putting pressure on housing, job availability and services
	Interactions and consequences			

A number of points are noteworthy:

- In *material* terms urban poverty is distinctive in the low levels of material and human capital and the role of poor and risky environmental, housing and working conditions.
- In *structural* terms the main problems include unemployment, job insecurity, and lack of formal or inadequate informal security, insecure tenurial status, high price of good and inflation,

rising violence and crime, social exclusion notably of beggars, street children and sex workers, and vulnerability of female headed and elderly headed households.

- In *efficient* terms vulnerability to loss of means of subsistence, commoditization of the urban economy and rapid population growth notably due to rural-urban migration are significant.
- In *final* terms worries about old age without security, effects of promoting growth with insufficient safety nets and rising crime are major concerns.
- The urban economy is influenced by external factors notably rising fuel prices and inflation and migration both externally in terms of labour migration abroad and remittances, and from pressure on housing, jobs and services from rural migration.

10. Implications for policy thinking, research, prioritisation, design and implementation

10.1. Policy thinking

There are three (inter-penetrating) multi-level systems involved in the re/pro/duction of Ethiopia's poverty: the economic livelihood system; the political management system; and the cultural system. In relation to the first in terms of incidence there needs to be an initial distinction between agriculturalist, pastoralist, and urban livelihood systems, though there are obviously structural relations between the two, and then further deconstruction within each based on rich knowledge rather than simple indicators. In relation to the second there needs to be a deconstruction of poverty incidence in terms of Region, zone where appropriate, *wereda*, *kebele*, *kebele* (relevant) parts, and households. Cultural systems are important in providing rules which can lead to poverty resulting from exclusion, exploitation, domination, and/or violation. Policy thinking which ignores politics and culture will be ineffective and possibly counter-productive.

The different kinds of cause are more or less amenable to policy intervention, partly related to their 'durability'. Material and social structures and many human beings are resistant to change and 'smart' interventions will be based on knowledge about where the best entry points are in particular contexts. Development only happens when people change what they do, and that is most effectively achieved when they change what they think. Ideologies cannot be imposed. Policy thinkers also need to be clear about whether their intervention is aimed at a particular cause of interacting set of causes of poverty, or whether it is aimed at alleviating rather than preventing poverty. In both cases other causal processes will not stop and they may interact with the policy action to produce unintended and perhaps undesirable consequences.

Policy thinkers also need to be thoughtful about the social level at which a particular intervention is best aimed, and if it is at a low level, establish realistic structural and cultural connections between the high-level policy decision and the system at which it is aimed. They also need to monitor the whole policy process on a regular basis using a realist rather than simple measurement approach (Pawson and Tilly, 1997).

10.2. Policy research

Respectable social scientific policy research is predominantly done by economists using survey methods and administrative data focused on the household and the country, analysed using sophisticated statistical techniques, often in search of 'universals' as the basis for generalisations. Our paper has shown the importance of the household in all its diversity, and other social levels, particularly the nested political and livelihood systems which in Ethiopia tend to come together at community level. Policymakers and implementers do not have the quantitative and qualitative data and interpretation which they need on the diverse livelihoods, family structures, community relations and management, and the cultural ideas which underpin the aspirations of people of different genderages.

10.3. Policy design

Development policy is prone to fashions which can lead to inefficiency in the use of a country's resources. Some are donor-driven. For example, it is not obvious from an Ethiopian perspective why so much effort and so many resources have gone into promoting universal primary education while the country's huge health problems have been so badly neglected. Others have come from the government, often being universally imposed. Development policies should be designed with particular real livelihood system and social communities in mind, which means getting to grips with diversity.

It should be a matter of regular practice for government and donors to have plans to deal with knowable poverty-creating consequences of policy interventions and to monitor for unexpected consequences in order to deal with or compensate for them.

10.4. Policy implementation

The Government and the World Bank have very different ideas about how interventions should be implemented. Both policy styles are founded in ideology rather than management studies. The government's top-down campaigning style is necessarily the one that prevails but our research has shown that it is resented by most rural residents, especially when the policy intervention is not appropriate for the particular community. The World Bank liberal ideology does not have a programme to deal with all the things that are 'missing' and it is not clear how the thinking in policy papers such as the WBCEM relate to the Bank's lending and advisory activities.

10.5. Policy in practice

What happens in practice is almost invariably different from what was intended by policy designers for all the reasons described in the paper. But very little is known about what does happen in practice; hence the call for 'realistic evaluation'.

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
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
Annex A: Changes in measures of community consumption wealth ERHS 1994-2004

1. ERHS sites organised by Region 1994-2004


Change in consumption wealth: sites by region




Changes in consumption wealth: Amhara



Change in consumption: Tigray




Change in consumption: SNNP




2. ERHS sites organised by livelihood system


Change in consumption 1994-2004: Cash food crops for towns




Change in consumption 1994-2004: vulnerable cereal



Change in consumption: highly populated enset



Change in consumption 1994-2004: International cash crop



Annex B: Causes of community wealth/poverty – agriculturalist communities

Table B1 : Cash food crops for sale in towns

	State in 1994	Changes to 2003	Mean consumption 1 month 2004 <i>birr</i>	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Sirbana Godeti, Oromia	In the fertile Ad'a plain Sirbana Godeti are two mid-altitude road-side villages producing cereals and pulses. <i>Tef</i> is the major cash crop and livestock and their products are also traded.	Weather dry 1999-2001; 2002 good rainy season 'Investment' by a certain individual is grabbing our land with no benefit. Young migrate to towns for work. Increased trade. A few grain traders	145	+59%	Steady to 1997, big increase to 1999, very small increase to 2004
Debre Berhan, Amhara	Four sites near the town of Debre Berhan are in a highland cereal producing area that is generally self-supporting. There are differences in wealth between the four sites.	Land redistribution in 1997. Frost problems. Increase in women selling dungcakes, straw, eggs etc. Irrigation programme but not implemented. Since 1999 annual food for work	121	+51%	Peak in 1997, slow decline since
Yetmen, Amhara	A mid-altitude site producing cereals; cash from selling <i>tef</i> , trading and migration.	1997 land redistribution unfair. <i>Newtef</i> and wheat seeds and coffee. Sharp decline price of crops 2001, poor prices in 2002, better 2003 but farmers can't get credit for fertiliser as they could not pay their debts. Change in weather – rain shortage in September. New cattle breeds but not accepted. An irrigation scheme was begun on grazing land but stopped by livestock owners. Irregular daily labour in Yetmen town. Some youth migration for work but less than previously. Expansion of trade.	121	+25%	Down-return-down-up to higher position
Turufe Kecheme, Oromia	A peri-urban site near Shashemene producing cereals and potatoes which are sold as cash crops as are livestock.	High use of fertiliser and new seeds; serious problems shortage of land and no employment opportunity for children with 12 th grade. Rare cash crops: sugarcane, chat, coffee. Cultivation of enset, coffee, eucalyptus increased. Avocado, mango etc. The climate is changing: rainfall is more erratic than before, especially 2002. Some carpenters, traders. Cross-breeding increased cows' milk production. Increase in women going to work in Arab countries.	79	+11%	Decline to 1995, steady increase to 1999, decline to 2004

Table B2: Food-deficit cereal sites vulnerable to drought/famine

	State in 1994	Changes up to 2003	Mean consumption 1 month 2004 <i>birr</i>	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Shumsheha, Amhara	Lowland site near Lalibela airport producing cereals and pulses, with. Vulnerable to famine; seasonal migration for daily labour and cotton-picking; food for work.	Limited irrigation schemes undertaken by different NGOs since 1991 – papaya, coffee, onion, green pepper; new variety of <i>tef</i> ; FFW, increasing migration	107	+34%	Steady improvement
Do'oma, SNNP	Lowland site resulting from resettlement in 1985 growing cereals notably maize; main sources of cash are cotton production, weaving and trade in livestock products. The site relies on irrigation but is vulnerable to drought. Bananas	Since 2001 employment opportunities for women and young men at Zage Agro-Industry plc. Fertiliser, ground-nut, mango, avocado introduced.	82	+138%	Good increase to 1995, small decline to 1997, big increase to 1999, steady to 2004
Harresaw, Tigray	Highland escarpment site producing cereals notably barley; main sources of cash are selling livestock, migration, and salt trade. Vulnerable to famine. Used to migrate to Eritrea for work.	Fertiliser and seeds are available but lack of water. Drought in 1993/4; 1995/6; 2001-2003. Increasing land shortage, dependence of most on FFW. 1993 dam built; small no of people use irrigation. Migration to Afar to bring salt. Ethiopia-Eritrea war stopped migration to Eritrea in 1998. Increasing urban migration.	76	+44%	Slight decline to 1995, steady increase to 1999, flat
Geblen, Tigray	Highland escarpment site which used to depend on livestock and produce cereals, notably barley; main sources of cash are selling livestock and labour migration. Vulnerable to famine since 1984.	Before Ethiopia-Eritrea war many young people migrated to Djibouti, Saudi and Yemen (illegally) and towns in Eritrea. Remittances from migrants. FFW started 2001. Commuting and seasonal migration for daily labour (good stone masons). Livestock have all died. Women sell eggs, crops, chickens; some work in nearby towns. Very few shops, tearooms. Water reservoir under construction in 2003.	74	+140%	Slight decline to 1995, main increase to 1997, slight down then up
Dinki, Amhara	A small lowland site producing mainly <i>tef</i> , maize and sorghum, with some irrigated fruit around the river. The site is vulnerable to famine.	Drought and famine recur. The irrigation improved: people grow chat, coffee, sugarcane, papaya, mango, banana, onions, cotton. Cash crops are more productive than food crops. Weaving and spinning, petty trade, blacksmithing, daily wage labour, FFW. Urban migration for daily labour and secondhand clothes trade.	65	+62%	Steady slow growth
Korodegaga, Oromia	Lowland site by the Awash river; main crops maize, <i>tef</i> , and pulses; main sources of cash livestock, firewood sales, irrigated vegetables. Vulnerable to drought.	Badly affected by 2003 drought; 'always waiting for the helping hands of the government'. FFW. Livestock decreased due to drought. Malaria. Increased urban migration for daily labour. Irrigation scheme built by UNICEF out of use. Three inward investors using pumps. Irrigation started by an NGO 2001-2006: onions and tomatoes – daily labour. 2002 – buying of pumps in groups. Fertiliser use but not enough rain. Women sell firewood.	64	+120%	Steady slow growth to 1999 then decline to 2004

Table B3: Highly populated enset sites

	State in 1994	Changes to 2003	Mean consumption 1 month 2004 <i>birr</i>	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Aze Deboa, SNNP	Within the highly populated <i>enset</i> growing area; cereals, pulses and vegetables are the main crops. Cash from livestock and their products, eucalyptus, <i>chat</i> and coffee, trade and migration for work at sugar factory.	Lack of rainfall and volatility in harvests. Coffee output decline and price decline. Coffee disease. Loss of crops to wild animals. Selected seeds available but no fertiliser. Increase in livestock sharing. Some beef fattening. Some employment in coffee threshing and purifying companies. A few in stone and gravel trade. Increase in migration.	81	11%	Volatile, below 1994 measure until 2004
Gara Godo, SNNP	A densely populated middle altitude <i>enset</i> -growing site; main other crops are maize, vegetables, and fruit. Cash from trade and migration plus sale of coffee and livestock products. Vulnerable to famine. Some weaving, blacksmithing and pottery.	New varieties of maize, wheat and teff increased outputs but drought. Increase in <i>enset</i> and sweet potato. Increase in livestock sharing. Increase in off-farm activities: daily labour, petty trading (but it has become non-profitable), seasonal migration for farm (govt and investors come to recruit) and urban employment. 2000 drought and famine; 2001 serious famine Oxfam/World Vision distribute food aid. 2002 drought, 2003 famine.	63	270%	Steady increase
Imdibir, SNNP	A mid-altitude site near a town producing <i>enset</i> , maize, and vegetables. The main cash crop is eucalyptus trees.	<i>Enset</i> disease. No employment opportunities. Decrease in cereal production; cannot afford fertiliser. <i>Chat</i> became the important cash crop but income decreased because of govt tax. increase Changed weather conditions (from cool to dry and hot) affected <i>chat</i> . Inflation. Migration to urban areas for jobs including children. Women – petty trade, craftwork. Children selling secondhand clothes at roadside. Some construction labour opportunities	35	-11%	Down to 1995, peak 1997, then decline

Table B4: Subsistence plus international cash crops

	State in 1994	Changes to 2003	Mean consumption 1 month 2004 <i>birr</i>	% change since 1994	Trajectory shape
Adele Keke, Oromia	Middle altitude site producing cereals, and vegetables (potato) and <i>chat</i> for sale. Site regularly affected by rain failure; in bad years is dependent on food aid.	Changing weather conditions and drought. A few irrigation pumps. Trade in milk and <i>chat</i> . Working for the Chinese Road and Bridge Authority, new building at Alemayehu University. Commuting to towns for work as daily labourers. Quantity and price of <i>chat</i> has increased. New varieties of maize, sorghum, potato. 4 shops recently opened.	62	-37%	Down to 1995, good increase to 1997, then decline
Adado, SNNP	A middle altitude <i>enset</i> -growing site with a wide variety of crops, livestock, and coffee as the major cash crop. Badly affected by 2002 drought	The life of the people depended on the price of coffee which was reported as declining since 1998. Yields are good on average every other year. Avocado and banana introduced. Some bull fattening. Some grow maize with fertiliser. Seasonal migration to work in govt gold mine. Petty trade. Change in weather – shortage of rainfall.	45	-26%	Down to 1995, good increase to 1997, then decline

Annex C: Some evidence about the causes of pastoralist poverty

Half the land in Ethiopia (52%) is pastoralist habitat (Markakis 2003:1). Currently over 12 million people live in the pastoral lowlands representing about 15% of the population. Ethiopian livestock 'represents by far the largest concentration of domestic herds in any one African country' (Hogg 1997:8). Regarding the regional distribution of pastoralism the World Bank Pastoral Community Development Project Appraisal Document (2003) noted that:

'Pastoralism is extensively practised in the Somali and Afar national Regional states (Regions), in the Borana zone of the Oromia national Regional state, and in the South Omo zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPR) national Regional state. Pastoralists are also found in areas of Tigray, Benishangul and Gambella Regions. These lowlands encompass almost seven million people, in excess of 500,000 km² (61 percent of the area of Ethiopia) and over eleven million animals' (World Bank 2003).

The Statement on Pastoral Development Policy issued by the Ministry of Federal Affairs¹⁹ noted:

'Pastoralists inhabit over half of the Ethiopian territory. There are at least 120 districts (*Woredas*) in all, 51 in Somali state, 29 in Afar state, 33 in Oromia state and 7 in the Southern Nations and Nationalities state. The total population of pastoralists in Ethiopia is estimated to be over 7 million'.

Pastoralists have tended to be regarded as economically poorer and politically marginalised for twelve inter-related reasons.

- 1) In geographical terms their presence in the lowland border areas has meant that they are less accessible to state structures and services.
- 2) Their mobility and limited representation in state structures until recently resulted in their interests not being articulated or defended.
- 3) They have been portrayed as practicing a backward and obsolete mode of livelihood, that is not responsive to market forces and interests and successive regimes have therefore sought to settle them on the grounds of providing them with services, reducing conflict etc.
- 4) The best lands in pastoralist areas, by water sources and river valleys which have been vital for dry season grazing and crucial to the sustainability of the pastoral economy have often been alienated for agricultural production, including both state and private irrigation schemes starting from the imperial period to this day.
- 5) Some of the best pastoral areas have been taken over for livestock ranching and fattening schemes, pushing pastoralists to more marginal and contested areas, sometimes exacerbating intergroup resource-based conflict.
- 6) The restriction in pastoralist mobility has pushed them to exploit more marginal lands more intensively thereby degrading the resource base, and increasing conflict between groups.
- 7) The establishment of farms has attracted considerable migrant skilled and unskilled labour so that pastoralists have often not benefited much from such development ventures, and migrants have been involved in expanding agriculture and charcoal burning, and their presence has altered the demographic balance and exacerbated population pressure.
- 8) Many of the areas where pastoralists live have been declared wildlife parks or reserves with the eviction or threat of displacement of pastoralist groups often with little or no compensation.

¹⁹ This is in appendix 12 of the Pastoralist community Development Project Appraisal Document (World Bank 2003).

- 9) In response to external threat and internal pressures, enclosures by leaders or the more wealthy within pastoralist societies have weakened solidarity and increased pressure on resources.
- 10) In response to multiple pressures some sections of the pastoralists have become sedentary and engage in sedentary agriculture, increasing land-based conflict and fuelling tensions between agricultural and pastoral livelihoods.
- 11) Due to recurrent drought and famine at decreasing intervals, many pastoralists have become impoverished, lost their stock and become wage labourers on agricultural schemes or in urban areas.
- 12) Persistent insecurity and conflict in many of the pastoral lowland areas has hindered development and the fact that many pastoralists live on both sides of borders with neighbouring countries has made them suspect in terms of inter-state relations.

As a result of these factors pastoral areas are acknowledged to be among the poorest in Ethiopia. As is noted in the PASDEP:

Poverty remains particularly intense in the pastoral areas, both in terms of low income and food consumption, and high in terms of the risk of sudden drops in income. Asset loss due to the death of livestock during droughts make it particularly difficult for pastoralist communities to recover from shocks. Furthermore, social indicators – whether they are literacy and education levels, or health status, are among the lowest in vulnerability, defined the country, as are the effective coverage of social services and infrastructure (FDRE 2007:191).

Regarding education and health care the situation in pastoralist areas is well below national averages. Regarding education the PASDEP notes:

The gross primary enrolment ratio for Afar, and the Somali regions are 13.8%, and 15.1%, respectively for the last year of SDPRP (2004/05). The key problems of education are access to schools, the poor fit with pastoralist lifestyles, and quality and efficiency problems due to shortages of trained staff, and cultural taboo towards sending girls to school (FDRE 2007:194).

In terms of health the PASDEP notes:

Status and outcomes are uniformly lower in the pastoralist regions than elsewhere in the country, in terms of indicators such as infant and maternal mortality. Health system coverage is also lower in most of the pastoral areas. The available health facilities are found haphazardly distributed, lack medicines and medical equipment, and are short of staff. These factors are exacerbated by low levels of health education, Harmful Traditional Practices (HTPs), incidence of epidemic resulted from flood, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (FDRE 2007:194).

The highest infant and under five mortality rates are found in Afar and Gambella regions, and vaccination coverage is lowest in Somali region and two in Gambella.²⁰ However it is noteworthy that malnutrition rate *in normal times* are generally below national averages in pastoral areas, as can be seen in table 9, suggesting an important role for the pastoral milk component in the diet. Nonetheless pastoralist areas as noted earlier are particularly prone to drought and malnutrition rates rise sharply in periods of drought and famine.

There is no doubt that pastoralist populations have less access to services and tend to have significantly less non-livestock assets than farming populations. However, in terms of livestock,

²⁰ Statistics are not available for Afar.

pastoralist communities are generally wealthier than most farming communities, although livestock ownership is uneven, and to some extent controlled by elderly men and powerful leaders.

Differentiation in pastoralist societies

Although pastoralist communities are generally considered poorer, there are also significant and increasing differences within pastoralist societies. Some of these differences are *between* pastoralist societies whereas others are internal differences *within* pastoralist groups. Differences between pastoralist groups depend on a number of factors. These include the size of the group. Whereas the Somali numbered over 3 million and the Afar almost a million in the 1994 Census other groups are much smaller,²¹ with a few under 100,000 notably the Nuer, quite a few with under 50,000 such as the Anywa, Dasanech, Hamar, Nyangatom, and Suri and others with less than 10,000 such as the Arbore, Bodi, Mursi, and Tsamai. There are also differences relating to the extent of cultivation, use of irrigation and trade. Historically some groups such as the Afar and Somali have had an important role in trade, and the former developed a sultanate and have long been involved in irrigated agriculture. Along the Omo and Wayto valleys a number of small agro-pastoralist groups such as the Dasanech, Mursi, Tsamai and Hor have been involved in flood retreat cultivation.

Although pastoralists have a reputation for being egalitarian, there are also significant differences within some pastoralist societies, often based on status related to being clan chiefs or leaders. The Pastoralist Community Development Project Appraisal document states:

There is a marked differentiation within pastoral society in terms of livestock holdings, the most common measure of relative wealth. There are few very rich households, with large mixed herds of camels and/or cattle, equines and small ruminants. The households that are more or less viable are those of pastoralists who can live mainly from their livestock and the agropastoralists who have enough animals to buffer against crop harvest shortfalls. Very poor agropastoral households have only a small flock of small ruminants, a couple of cattle, and uncertain harvests from rainfed crops. The destitute have access to neither livestock nor land. As a very rough estimate based on wealth/poverty ranking results in recently published reports, about 5–10% of pastoral peoples in the proposed project areas could be considered rich to very rich, about 25–35% viable, about 40–50% poor to very poor, and about 15–20% destitute.

Drought has led to processes leading to impoverishment and 'falling out' of the poor from the pastoralist economy, and has been exacerbated by refugee and returnee movements. Differences have also emerged based on control of livestock and enclosures of land and water points, such that richer herd owners employ poorer ones, and leaders or more wealthy men who control land have been able to hire labourers.²²

The destitute depend on selling charcoal and firewood, fetching water for town dwellers, tending herds for the rich, working as watchmen or labourers, charging tourists for handicrafts or photographs (particularly in South Omo) and traditional social welfare networks, where these still function. Many "modern" destitute are refugees, former pastoralists who live partly from food aid complemented by selling charcoal and firewood and fetching water for town dwellers. Some of the agropastoralists and destitute have settled at least temporarily in towns and refugee camps. The very poor do not send their children to school, have little or no access to health facilities, suffer from food shortage and take no

²¹ The Guji numbered over 480,000 and the Borana almost 160,000 in the 1984 census but they were included within the Oromo category in the 1994 Census

²² Baxter referred to this as 'the new East African Pastoralism stating: 'At present class formation is incipient rather than existent and pastoralists by a large make up a moral community of shared suffering rather than one divided by hereditary inequalities. But the sense of unity in suffering is wearing away. Rich pastoralists who employ herders for cash wages are now commonplace' (1993:15).

part in community decision-making. They eat wild foods in a normal year, not just during crises. Female-headed households tend to be among the very poor and destitute.

The pastoral groups have various institutions for mutual aid, e.g. making a contribution for a clan member with a severe problem, loaning milk animals for a short period, or helping a family to restock when it loses animals through misfortune. Movement of family members to towns to seek work in non-pastoral sectors may create new types of socio-economic links between rural and urban areas, but it is not clear to what extent these offer new types of social safety nets (WB 2003).

Causes of poverty and wealth in pastoralists areas can be summarised in terms of the five types of causes as follows:

Annex D: Some evidence about the causes of urban poverty

The UN Centre for Human Settlements study (2000) considers the main distinguishing features of urban poverty to be related to dependence of the urban poor on wage labour in the informal sector, with a lack of protection from sickness injury and unpredictable demand for their services. Other aspects include limited human and material capital, lack of assets, and access to credit markets to cope with shock. Furthermore, urban poverty may be exacerbated by poor environmental conditions, changes in prices of basic goods, lack of social networks, violence and insecure tenurial status, the commodification of the urban economy and the negative effects of government actions. The report suggests that:

'the environment and health risks faced by the urban poor result from the juxtaposition of industrial and residential functions; competition for land; high living densities, overcrowded housing, traffic congestion, pollution and the mismatch between urban growth and the provision of clean water supply, sanitation, solid waste disposal etc' (UNCHS 2000:6).

The report also suggests that the poor are victims of urban crime and social disarticulation, and lack of tenure security. Social exclusion of beggars, street children and sex workers is considered another characteristic of urban poverty in Ethiopia.

A paper by Feleke Tadele (2004) reviewing studies on urban poverty suggests that the major aspects of urban poverty include unemployment and underemployment, high food prices, homelessness, lack of sanitation, the failure of municipalities to deliver social services, limited access to water and electricity and acute problems of transportation. Aklilu Kidanu and Desalegn Rahmato (2000) argued that the most serious problems that are mainly found in urban areas include unemployment, rapid population growth and absence of health and sanitation services. An interesting suggestion is that there is an improvement in gender relations in favour of women. In a study of four towns the same authors suggest that urban livelihood insecurity includes the threat of impoverishment and loss of basic means of sustenance, income insufficiency, job insecurity, hazardous working conditions, and anxiety about old age (Desalegn and Aklilu 2002).

Regarding the persistence of urban poverty a paper by Abbi Kedir and Andy McKay (2005) based on the Ethiopian Urban Household Survey panel data on seven towns collected over the period 1994–97 suggests the existence of a sizeable level of chronic urban poverty, which appears to be strongly associated with high dependency rates, low levels of human capital, and unemployment / underemployment. A further paper by Abbi Kedir (2005) suggests that there are strong gender dimensions, with female headed households more likely to be persistently poor, and lack of education and involvement in casual work also being associated with continued poverty.

In the Participatory Poverty Assessment (MoFED 2005) the worse-off were characterised as engaged in petty trade, daily labour (which is more likely to be casual and unskilled), prepare and sell *injera*, sell firewood, and do domestic work. They had worse housing quality, access to services, education and ownership of consumer goods. The most important reasons for downward movements were illness (especially of the household head), family size increases, the decline in contraband trading that had occurred over the previous five years, asset sales to secure enough food, divorce, and increased competition in trading activities (caused by new entrants into petty trading). The vulnerable groups were the youth, the disabled, the elderly, squatters, and those infected by HIV/AIDS.

The PPA concludes that 'Vulnerability in urban areas takes the form of being almost continuously on the edge of insufficient food for daily maintenance, and often falling below that line. It also often involves crowded and insanitary living conditions in poor quality housing squatting in shacks made of plastic and scraps of wood, and exposure to personal danger. Factors predisposing to vulnerability included lack of education and skills, and inability to start-up self employment enterprises due to lack

of savings or credit. The most prevalent complaints concerned the rising cost-of-living, the prevalence of petty crime and theft, the extent of unemployment, and sanitation problems (MoFED 2005).

Characterisations of the poor and destitute in the two urban sites of the Wellbeing in Developing Countries Project were as follows. In Kolfe an area in the western outskirts of Addis Ababa:

Poor people live in rented houses owned by the *kebele* or private individuals, their income is mainly used for food consumption, and they cannot afford to send their children to school or cover the cost of medical treatment. This group mainly includes pensioners, ex-soldiers and small businesspeople. Destitute people are likely to be disabled, physically weak, elderly without help, and/or unskilled... Desertion is a frequent problem for poor destitute women. Most destitute husbands desert their wives for reasons such as unemployment, large family size, job-hunting and quarrels. In addition, divorced women are socially stigmatised, being suspected of having multiple sexual partners and are blamed for increasing prostitution.... The poor work for the rich for small amounts of money or for food. In some areas, the rich systematically exclude the poor from iddir. ...Some poor informants say that the rich look down at them.

(Kolfe Community Profile 2006).

In the cross-roads town of Shashemene the poor and destitute were described as follows:

The poor are those engaged as daily labourers or involved in the informal sector. At the bottom are the destitute who live without any income of their own. They depend on the community for a living. Most of them are living by begging (Shashemene Community Profile 2006)

The most vulnerable in urban areas include street children, sex workers, the elderly, beggars and disabled and the food insecure. The following table from the Urban Poverty Participatory Action Research Initiative provides estimated figures and proportions for these categories.

Table 20: numbers and proportion of vulnerable categories in five secondary cities

	Adama		Awassa		Bahir Dar		Jimma		Mekele	
Street children	5000	2.52	6378	5.86	9548	0.06	4000	2.90	2000	1.35
Sex workers	5800	2.92	3879	3.56	20000	0.13	650	0.47	950	0.64
elderly	22425	11.30	8009	7.36	7456	0.05	10000	7.24	NA	
beggars and disabled	6500	3.27	5111	4.70	4024	0.03	5410	3.92	9000	6.09
food insecure	36000	18.13	NA		NA		5410	3.92	16,000	10.82

adapted from UNDP/DAG 2004.

Annex E: Intra-community causes of household poverty

In two recent papers using data from four DEEP sites selected from the ERHS sites we identified two major structural causes of household poverty: unequal social status relations and institutions (Bevan and Pankhurst 2007) and the household's situation in relation to the ideal household cycle(s) of the community (Pankhurst and Bevan, 2007).

1. Unequal social status

1.1. Ethnicity and religion

Our sites are in two regions: Amhara and Oromia. Two of the sites are relatively homogenous in ethnic terms and 'representative' of their respective regions: Yetmen is overwhelmingly Amhara and Korodegaga overwhelmingly Oromo. The two other sites are more diverse: Dinki has both Argobba (60 percent) and Amhara (40 percent), and Turufe has a majority of Oromo (57 percent), and migrant minorities from the South (Wolayta 10%, Kambata 6%, Hadiya 4%, Gurage 5%) representing about a quarter of the population and northern migrants (Amhara-Tigray) about 17 percent.

In terms of power relations ethnicity has been important mainly in the two heterogeneous sites. In Dinki the Amhara landlords who came from the highlands in the imperial times obtained land and the Argobba tended to be looked down on. During the Derg period the Argobba as well as Amhara tenants gained access to land. During the EPRDF period the Argobba were accorded more political prominence as an ethnic group with its own political party and representation in the parliament. However, still today in terms of land and livestock holdings and other indicators of wealth the Argobba have slightly lower averages than the Amhara.

In Turufe Kecheme the migrant groups particularly those from the North and especially those from Tigray gained economic power in the imperial period through exploiting larger land-holdings and involvement in trade. The migrants' superiority continued during the Derg period with the Kembata, who had a strong political position, becoming particularly active in the Derg regime. In 1991 at the time of the change of government the Oromo gained the ascendancy and most of the Kembata were expelled and their land taken over. A few Eritreans were also expelled at the time of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and very few have remained. Several of the few traders are Tigrayan or Amhara. However, positions in the *Kebele* Administration are fully controlled by the Oromo. Some migrant labourers have faced discrimination or employers not honouring payments, and there were attempts to restrict or ban migrant labourers. The migrant groups have been uneasy about their status, and the northerners in particular feared expulsions if the EPRDF lost power in the 2005 elections. Although expulsions have not taken place they express feelings of insecurity, and some have adopted a strategy of sending their offspring to live, study and work in local towns and in Addis Ababa.

In Korodegaga in 1994 the only ethnic group living in the site were Oromo. In 2005 there were about 30 migrant labourers, mostly young men, who worked in groups of four or more on the land rented and irrigated by the investors. Most of them were Amharas from Wello and some from Eastern Shewa, and there were also some Wolayta. They came into the community alone without any family members and lived in temporary tent-like houses which they built around the irrigated farms of the investors who rented the land from the locals. Some of these labourers also rented land from local farmers and produced vegetable cash crops. There were also a few share-cropper migrant labourers. The investors said they preferred to employ migrant labourers because they believe that the temporary settlers are hard-workers and well-experienced in irrigation work. There was no strong social interaction between the migrants and locals, but there were some conflicts. Local people accused them of raping their daughters and introducing bad habits like drinking.

Many people of Korodegaga say that they are Arssi and, at the same time, Oromo because they are Muslims. They consider the non-Muslim population of the Oromo as 'Amhara' which to them means

Christianised Oromo. As one female informant puts it, 'the Amhara [to mean the Christian Oromo of Eastern Shewa] like their stomach; on market days both men and women enter hotels to eat food and to drink alcohol; women are not afraid to enjoy the company of men. However, the Arssi do not give much attention to their stomach; they prefer to sell their farm outputs and livestock to the Amhara to consume at home; and women are culturally forbidden to enjoy themselves with men in hotels.' Thus, we can understand from the above description that people call themselves Arssi in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Oromo population. During the *Derg* regime the local governments said that, 'all Arssi Muslims and Shewa Oromo must be called by the name of 'Oromo'. Arssi is the name of the region.' So some Muslims have accepted this concept but others still believe 'we are Arssi'.

Historic conflicts with neighbouring ethnic groups were reported from Korodegaga and Dinki, although the regular Korodegaga conflicts with Jille pastoralists are said to be a thing of the past. In Dinki both Amhara and Argobba consider the Afar to be traditional enemies involving regular armed conflicts in market places such as Dulecha, Zuti and Senbete and some theft of cattle and camels.

There is a correlation between ethnicity and religion but it is not perfect. 19% of Amhara are not Orthodox Christians and 24% of Oromo are not Muslims. The Argobba are all Muslims while all four religions (Islam, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic christianity) are covered by the ethnic groups from SNNP in Turufe Kecheme.

1.2. Occupational 'caste'

Throughout Ethiopia there are minority groups of craftworkers and hunters that are excluded from mainstream society. The marginalisation of these groups is not a new or localised phenomenon. It occurs in the north and the south, in towns and in the countryside, in the past and in the present. ...it is so widespread that it has been described as a 'pan-Ethiopian cultural trait' (Levine 1974: 56). (Pankhurst, 2001: 1)

In all sites there are also small minorities involved in non-farming occupations including smiths, potters, in some cases tanners and weavers. Apart from the last category they tend to be despised, and interaction with them is constrained and intermarriage unheard of. In Dinki all five full-time weavers and ten out of 11 part-time weavers are Argobba and this is considered a respectable occupation. The only part-time leatherworker is also Argobba, but the two part-time smiths are Amhara. In Turufe the only full-time leatherworker is from the Wolayta minority. However, insofar as craftworkers are able to farm as well as obtain income from craftwork they may become relatively wealthy as in Yetmen, and their status can improve. Other skilled occupations such as those of carpenters, masons, and tailors in all sites may be means to becoming relatively wealthy involving occasional or seasonal work in urban areas.

1.3. Clans

Clanship is very important for the Oromo Arssi in Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme, with certain clans claiming superior status, respect or precedence, numerical predominance, prior land rights or precedence in the *gada* age grading institution in the area.

The significance of clanship has declined but it is still important in murder cases, with group responsibility for blood compensation payments, and also to some extent for bridewealth payments.

Though belonging to descent groups is no longer the relevant social distinction it used to be in imperial times in Amhara societies, in Yetmen individuals can sometimes gain access to land through close maternal as well as paternal relatives; Disputes, particularly murder cases, can result in family feuds.

1.4. Former slaves

In Yetmen former slaves descended from Southerners brought to the Amhara Region to work during

the Imperial regime have been despised and looked down upon by the *chewa* of “noble birth” and even by the craftworkers. Former tenants and herdsmen may also be considered somewhat inferior.

1.5. Natives and immigrants

Distinctions are drawn for some purposes between natives (*balager*) and immigrants (*mete*). The status has some importance in Yetmen.

2. Ideal household cycles, deviations and poverty

A major conclusion of a paper the authors wrote on household poverty (Bevan and Pankhurst 2007) is that much of it is related to the household development cycle, and in particular to whether households follow the ideal cycle²³ or fall off it due to social shocks including inability to marry, divorce, death, etc. Table E1 presents types of households divided into ideal ones and corresponding 'deviator' households that have suffered a particular shock or event that destabilises them. Table E2 then goes on to show that 'deviator' household are more common among the very poor and destitute.

Table E1: Major household types experiencing extreme poverty

Ideal-type household cycle	Shock event or choice	Deviator households
1. Young man alone in household	Never to marry	12. Old man who never married
2. Young couple	Infertility	13. Young infertile woman divorced 14. Old infertile woman widowed
3. Young nuclear family: young man	Death of one Divorce/separation Death of children	15. Widow with young children 16. Widower with young children
4. Old man remarries and starts new family		
5. Mature nuclear family	Death of one Death of both Divorce/separation Death of children	17. Widow/divorced/separated woman with older children 18. Widower/divorced separated man with older children 19. Step-family 20. 3-generational mixed household young male head 21. Sibling household
6. Polygynous: 2 wives in same hh 7. Polygynous: Wife 1s household	Abandonment of Wife 1	22. Polygynous: abandoned wife 23. Polygynous: woman married to former lover and father of children
8. Emptying nest	Death of one Death of both Divorce/separation Death of children	24. Three-generational household headed by old female 25. Older woman with grandchild(ren) 26. Old male abandoned by successive wives
9. Male-headed three-generational hh	Old father dies or marries again	Household in transition towards ideal-type track
10. Nuclear family with old parent	Old parent dies	Household stays on track
11. Old couple	Death of one Last land passed to son(s)	27. Old man alone 28. Old woman alone

²³ Differences in the ideal cycle have cultural variants, and the differences between the ideal cycle in the Amhara, Oromo and Argobba cultures and their implications for poverty as discussed in Bevan and Pankhurst 2007.

We were able to show that there was a much higher likelihood of the deviator household being among the extremely poor (defined as those that were classified as very poor or destitute). Out of the 925 households included in the Resource and Needs Survey 161 were 'extremely poor' in terms of ownership of locally-valued productive assets: (51 destitute and 110 very poor). These extremely poor households constituted 17.4% of the combined samples.

Table E2 reveals that of these extremely poor households two thirds (65%) had suffered social shocks as compared with 38% of all households.

Table E2: Extremely poor households by household type

	Total ExtrP hhs: No	%	ExtP as % of all hhs	Hh type: all hhs	% all hhs in hh type	Gap
Young couple	2	1%	0.2%	23	2.5%	1.2%
Young nuclear family	33	20%	3.6%	214	23.1%	2.6%
Mature nuclear family	8	5%	0.9%	185	20.0%	15.0%
Polygynous: male head 2 wives	2	1%	0.2%	27	2.9%	1.7%
Polygynous: male head 1 wife	5	3%	0.5%	34	3.7%	0.6%
Emptying nest	2	1%	0.2%	16	1.7%	0.5%
Male-headed 3-generations	1	1%	0.1%	40	4.3%	3.7%
Nuclear family with old parent	2	1%	0.2%	16	1.7%	0.5%
Old couple	2	1%	0.2%	20	2.2%	0.9%
Total on ideal track	57	35%	6.2%	575	62.2%	26.8%
Widow/divorced/separated not alone	57	35%	6.2%	168	18.2%	-
Widower/divorced/separated not alone	5	3%	0.5%	18	1.9%	-1.2%
Stepfamily	5	3%	0.5%	46	5.0%	1.9%
Polygynous female-headed	2	1%	0.2%	14	1.5%	0.3%
Household in transition	8	5%	0.9%	37	4.0%	-1.0%
Female alone	15	9%	1.6%	20	2.2%	-7.2%
Male alone	7	4%	0.8%	24	2.6%	-1.8%
Couples living alone or with non-children	5	3%	0.5%	23	2.5%	-0.6%
Total off-track	104	65%	11.2%	350	37.8%	26.8%
Overall total	161	100%	17.4%	925	100.0%	0.0%

The gap measured in the last column shows that in all on-track categories there are smaller proportions of extremely poor households than of all households, with the biggest difference being for mature nuclear families which constitute 20% of the combined sample, while only 5% of mature nuclear families are extremely poor. There are higher proportions of extremely poor households in all off-track categories except stepfamilies and polygynous female-headed households.

There are also much higher proportions of female-headed among the extremely poor. While 18% of the combined sample are female-headed with dependents this is true of 35% of the extremely poor households.²⁴

²⁴ There is not the space here to discuss differences between the sites in terms of extreme poverty. See Bevan and Pankhurst 2007.