

**Power and Social Policy in Development Contexts: Ethiopia's
In/Security Regime**

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'TPLF¹ is in a wheelchair with constant supply of glucose from external power' (Ethioforum website: Anonymous July 19 2006)

'In recognition of Ethiopia's importance to the United States, the US Government, through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), is providing new funding totalling \$57.6 million to assist the Ethiopian people in three key areas: agriculture and private sector development, health care and primary education' (Website of the US Embassy in Ethiopia, 8 August 2006)

1. Introduction

'Poverty' has been a key focus of development discourses since the end of the 1980s and of international development policy and practice since the end of the 1990s. The focus on income or consumption poverty at household level, to be dealt with through economic growth (World Bank 1990), widened to cover human wellbeing, initially conceived in terms of health and education and later extended to include opportunity, 'empowerment' and security (World Bank 2001). In this context the question arose as to whether, and how, the kinds of 'social policy' developed in rich industrial and post-industrial countries could be extended to people in the 'majority world' to meet universal needs for, or rights to, security and human development.

One contribution to this ongoing debate on 'social policy in developing contexts' entailed 'a critical interrogation of the premises of Western social policy when applied to the different conditions of poor-country political economies' (Gough and Wood *et al.*: 2004: 3) which took Esping-Andersen's 'welfare regime' approach (1990) as a starting point. Three conclusions from this exercise, which involved empirical explorations of 'social policy' in Latin America, East Asia, Africa and Bangladesh, are particularly relevant for this paper. First, that 'social policy in practice' varies across meso contexts². Second, that 'developing contexts' also vary, dependent on niche in the global political economy, and third, that it is possible to identify three ideal-types of welfare or in/security³ regime: formal welfare regimes related to commodification, informal security regimes related to clientelisation, and insecurity regimes related to political contention. 'These are ideal-type constructs at a high level of abstraction: adopting the biological hierarchy they are *family* ideal types. Within them we may then go on to identify *genus* and *species*' (Gough 2004: 34).

Members of ideal-type *formal welfare regimes* can reasonably expect to meet their security and human development needs via participation in national or international markets and/or through state finance, services, and regulation. They have economic and social rights and opportunities of a formal kind that can be upheld in law. Members of *informal security regimes* mainly rely on family and community networks and organisations; insofar as they are included in these networks they have 'informal rights' (Wood, 2004). They also have related 'informal duties' to family and other community members. Such regimes are underpinned by a mix of exchange principles, hierarchy, solidarity, reciprocity, and market (Fiske: 1991), in varying structured proportions which must be empirically established. Gough has argued that 'these relationships are usually hierarchical and asymmetrical' (2004: 33). Hierarchical informal security regimes often involve problematic inclusion based on domination and/or exploitation particularly for poor people, women, children and the dependent elderly, and those of locally low social status⁴. The security and human development needs of people who are socially excluded are often not met at all. People caught up in *insecurity regimes* find themselves in situations of collective insecurity often involving famine and/or violent conflict. Family and community networks and organisations are undermined or destroyed as material resources are damaged or stolen and people die or flee their homes.

¹ There is a glossary of acronyms in the Appendix. The Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front dominates the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which has been in power in Ethiopia since 1991.

² 'Social policy' in Europe involves Government regulation and/or resource provision relating to income maintenance, housing, health, education and family welfare, particularly for people who are poor. 'Mainstream social policy' is a more or less clearly articulated set of ideas and intentional practices at macro level guiding what is being done to meet welfare needs. It is usually challenged by 'critical social policy' with an alternative set of ideas about what ought to be done. 'Social policy in practice' is socially constructed by participants in all the relevant meso contexts contained within the macro context, which leads to diversity in practices.

³ The concept of 'in/security' is neutral and more appropriate than 'welfare' for regimes that produce suffering for many.

⁴ Based for example on race, ethnicity, religion, clan, caste/occupation,.

There are two ways of studying in/security regimes. 'The first involves the identification of a particular type of regime on the basis of the dominant underlying economic and political relationships which generate insecurity and illfare' (Bevan, 2004a: 109). For welfare regimes it is the commodification of people related to capitalism, for informal security regimes relationships of clientelisation, for insecurity regimes political contention. 'Under current conditions of globalisation such regimes are not typically uniquely contained and/or totally diffused within nation-state boundaries. This is most likely to be the case for full-blooded welfare regimes which depend on powerful well-functioning states, and the least likely to be the case for insecurity regimes, since the state is usually a focus for contention, and the regime usually includes powerful external players' (*ibid*).

The second approach, which is used in this paper, involves country-level analysis to identify and describe the 'country in/security regime mix'. I have argued that most African countries have 'quadri-furcated' regime mixes. The very rich and political elites rely on the burgeoning international liberal market-based welfare regime using private hospitals and education and financial institutions in OECD countries. The next tier, who are mostly urban-based and formally employed or self-employed, use a mix of government and domestic market provision. The third category are dependent on local informal security regimes while the fourth category are embroiled in violent crisis situations involving the failure of state, market, community and often family welfare institutions. 'The balance of the four regimes varies between countries.' (Bevan 2004b: 203).

This paper is underpinned by a 'post-postmodern' and British⁵ sociological approach to social structures, agency and macro-meso-micro linkages (Mouzelis e.g. 1995, Archer e.g. 1995, Layder e.g.1998, Sibeon 2004) and uses an 'in/security regime mix framework' to select, analyse and interpret multi-method and multi-level data⁶ to produce a preliminary⁷ understanding of the state of Ethiopia's current in/security regime. Section 2 presents the conceptual and methodological framework, which was originally developed to produce comparable empirical evidence for analysis of social policy in differing developing contexts (Bevan, 1994a and 1994b). Section 3 briefly outlines the historical roots of Ethiopia's current in/security regime. Section 4 describes the current regime, which came to power in 1991. Section 5 provides some statistics on in/security outcomes during this regime at macro and regional levels, and identifies differences in outcome based on livelihood and personal differences. Section 6 explores the generators of in/security at macro, meso and regional and global levels, while Section 7 describes the welfare mix of organisations, institutions and practices which has evolved through attempts to meet welfare needs. Section 8 concludes by describing the interests served by current social policy structures and some recent mobilisations of relevance to them.

2. Researching social policy in developing contexts: an in/security regime framework

(i) Exploratory research

Empirical research is conducted in two major modes: exploratory and confirmatory. The first is more appropriate for research topics about which little is known. In such situations we need theoretical frameworks rather than substantive theories which must await the results of the explorations. The in/security regime framework described and used in an empirical analysis of some aspects of 'social policy' in Africa (Bevan, 2004a and b) was developed by sensitising Esping-Andersen's welfare regime framework to African conditions. The framework has five 'spaces of comparison': in/security outcomes; the structures and dynamics involved in the generation of insecurity and illfare; mobilisations by elites, non-elites and external actors; the welfare mix; and 'stratification' outcomes.

To use this framework in empirical analyses the regimes found in 'fragile states' (USAID: 2005) such as

⁵ I have written this paper for the APSA Conference in response to an invitation and am aware that in crossing (1) disciplinary boundaries and (2) 'the Pond' I am not engaging with ongoing debates within American political science.

⁶ Collected as part of the ESRC Wellbeing in Developing Countries Research Programme (2002 – 2007) at the University of Bath, UK. See www.welldev.org.uk and www.wed-ethiopia.org. Meso-level information presented in the paper comes from multi-method case study material collected in four rural communities between July 2003 and November 2005.

⁷ The paper is related to a multi-authored book in progress 'Power and Life Quality in Ethiopia: the Social and Cultural Construction of Wellbeing' due for completion by the end of 2006.

Ethiopia are modelled as inter-acting and dynamic complex open social systems with country and international participants. Data made⁸ through measurement and description at macro, meso and micro⁹ levels are thought of as 'traces' left by the operation through time of these dynamic systems (Byrne, 2002: 36). The significance of these traces is interpreted through 'intuitive induction' (*ibid*: 37).

(ii) The in/security regime framework

In/security outcomes

Until recently UK-based mainstream development thinkers and practitioners have been concerned with conventional economic and social policy objectives and processes: in particular to try to reduce household poverty through economic growth and latterly social protection, and to improve the human resources of health, nutrition and formal education through government provision. However, increasing attention to development issues across the disciplines has raised a set of questions about the aims of 'development'. From economics comes the notion of 'development as freedom' (Sen 1999) linked to the concept of empowerment and a new focus on 'happiness' (e.g. Layard 2005). From social anthropology and sociology comes the idea that 'wellbeing' is socially and culturally constructed (Gough and McGregor, 2007). The psychological instruments used in OECD countries for measuring 'subjective quality of life' (*ibid*) are being increasingly used in developing countries. And the recognition of the role of 'bad governance' in the perpetuation of poverty and suffering (e.g. DFID 2006) goes with increasing attention to development policy contexts by political scientists. In short academic and, to some extent, policy attention has shifted to more complex individual and collective in/security outcomes which involve elements of process, culture and power. These new approaches are being addressed in our wider research programme. However, in this paper the main focus is on the conventional social policy outcomes of household poverty and individual nutrition, health, and education.

The generation of in/security: socio-natural life processes and controlling and competitive power structures and mobilisations

In advanced capitalist societies social policy operates mainly through state intervention to compensate for the income poverty and human development failures which would be produced by the unregulated operation of markets, particularly the labour market. In poor country contexts a wider range of harmful underlying social, economic and political relationships and institutions and their histories is involved in the generation of livelihood insecurity and human illbeing (Bevan, 2004a/b). Furthermore, risks resulting from socio-natural life processes such as diseases, natural disasters, human fertility, and ageing are greater, as a result of more dangerous environments and limited resources and material and organisational technologies to mitigate and compensate for them. Insecurity and illfare for 'inferiors' are also generated in controlling power relationships of exploitation, exclusion, and coercion which bring benefits to 'superiors', and through competitive power relationships among 'superiors' which produce destructive conflict. For each country regime it is necessary to identify the key power relations, actions and processes emanating from internal economic, political and socio-cultural structures and dynamics and the roles of relevant contextualising international structures and dynamics.

In poor countries with fragile states the potential insecurities suffered by the very rich, the political elite, and those associated with the higher echelons of the public and formal private sectors arise mainly from life processes such as ill-health and ageing in the context of 'commodification', although they may be at risk of unemployment, violence, imprisonment or exile as a result of political competition or upheaval. These elites are involved in a range of unequal and mediated relationships with the rest of the population, who are

⁸ Data are *made* by researchers in a process which involves the design of conceptual frameworks and research instruments to interrogate the particular reality under empirical investigation via observation and / or interviews. Secondary data may be *given* to those who use it but initially someone has made it.

⁹ 'Macro', 'meso' and 'micro' refer 'to the units and scales of analyses concerned with the investigation of varying temporal and spatial extensions of the social' Sibeon, 57. The macro-social order, 'though likely to have some influence upon social life at 'lower' – that is meso or micro levels of social process, may shape conditions not only in the direction of systemic stability and predictability, but also in the direction of unpredictability, indeterminacy and social flux.' Sibeon: 41

dispersed in a spatial and socio-cultural mapping of local informal security regimes based on clientelisation, which in some spaces may be engulfed in insecurity regimes involving political contention. The incidence and causes of insecurity and illfare in these regimes must be empirically established; they involve life processes which are poorly managed in the context of exploitative, exclusionary and coercive relationships related to 'genderage' and other locally salient markers of social status. Insecurity regimes may arise for shorter or longer periods of time in areas of famine and where violent conflict produces and reproduces insecurity, suffering and death, as political and military leaders mobilise followers to fight for control of land, natural resources and/or the state, often on the basis of socially-constructed 'primordial' identities of ethnicity, clan and/or religion.

Welfare mix: structures and past mobilisations

The controlling and competitive power relations described above are inter-twined with the compensatory power relations which underpin the welfare mix: the institutions and agencies attempting to deal with security and human development needs. These potentially involve hierarchically organised patronage exchanges, gifts, care and nurture, and more egalitarian sharing, co-operation, and reciprocity. The mix of these varies among cultures (Fiske 1991). In welfare state regimes the welfare mix combines compensatory structures, processes and actors related to the institutions of state, market, family and community. While in different countries the relative contributions of each of these institutional arenas varies for historical reasons, the state is the leading player.

Figure 1: The Current African Welfare Mix

Analytic arena	Roles for domestic actors ^a (examples)	External actors
Polity	<i>'Formal government'</i> : Ministries pursuing formal social policy, e.g. government schools and health service providers; food aid; regulators <i>'Informal government'</i> : (through patronage) Government politicians, bureaucrats, military, professionals <i>Non-government political actors</i> Legitimate and illegitimate Opposition party members; chiefs/kings; religious leaders; guerrillas; militias	International development and humanitarian organisations, regional organisations, national 'donors'
Market	<i>'Formal'</i> : Private employers, insurance companies, private schools, private health services providers <i>'Informal'</i> : Pharmacists, traditional medical practitioners, 'witches' and 'witchfinders'	TNCs as employers or providers of insurance, education, pharmaceuticals, health services, etc
Society	Neighbours, Big Men, clerics, congregations, religious schools, religious health services, Community Based Organisations including women's groups, hometown associations, secret societies, trade unions, development NGOs, burial societies, ROSCAs, other local organisations, altruists, bandits	International development and 'humanitarian' NGOs
Kin	Lineage members, clan members, 'households', extended family, (including domestic migrants)	International migrants and diasporas
Self	Self as domestic resident: theft, begging, famine food	Self as international migrant

^aSome actors play more than one role

Source: Bevan 2004a: 104

In developing countries informal security regimes operate at community levels in contexts where states are weak and formal sector labour markets are mostly absent; compensatory power relations operate mainly at community and family levels although the welfare mix involves a potentially larger set of players and institutions, some of which are international (see Figure 1).

Across both rural and urban communities the internal structures of the welfare mixes in informal security regime vary for geographical, cultural and historical reasons. In all cases there is 'meso-level intermediation with the national-level polity and economy' (Wood, 2004: 83) which invariably leads to subversion of the universal goals enshrined in donor-funded macro social policies and international NGO projects. In extreme cases of community exclusion local informal security regimes have little or no connection with

macro social policies¹⁰. In insecurity regime contexts survivors seek security by participating in the fighting, by seeking patrons among the warring factions, or by migrating, sometimes to refugee camps supported by international humanitarian aid.

'Stratification outcomes' and social reproduction and change

Global economic restructuring and technology advances, and the international political restructuring associated with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the 'war on terror', are associated with rapid change processes penetrating throughout the developing and declining world. It is not possible to understand how the structures and dynamics of in/security regimes in developing and declining countries are constituted without identifying their current niches in wider structures, taking a long historical view, and appreciating the role of culture, which provides some continuity across the modernising changes introduced in response to immediate external economic, political and cultural pressures. There can be slow or rapid changes in country regime mixes which may involve gradual evolution, periods of disequilibrium and turning points related to larger political and economic changes. In these contexts the choices made by powerful internal and external political actors play an important role.

(iii) The data

Much of the information in the paper comes from academic publications. Statistics on in/security outcomes and government budgets come from a variety of sources including the government's Central Statistical Agency, the World Bank and UNDP. Some of these statistics are made out of census and random sample household survey data such as the Welfare Monitoring and Demographic and Health Surveys and some come from sector Ministries. There are reasons to be sceptical of statistics which relate to government-set targets or which involve more assumption than fact. For example life expectancy in 2004 was estimated as 48 by UNICEF, 44.9 by UNDP and 40.88 by the CIA World Fact Book.

3. Precursors of Ethiopia's current in/security regime: from the Queen of Sheba to the Derg regime

(i) From the Queen of Sheba to the Era of the Princes

Ethiopian history can be traced back to the emergence of an important centre of civilisation in the north of the country in the 6th or 7th centuries B.C. (Pankhurst, R., 1999). The myth of the imperial Solomonic dynasty traces it back to Menelik 1, the son of King Solomon of Israel and Makeda, the 'Queen of Sheba'. 'All subsequent Ethiopian emperors, with the exception of the Zagwe kings (1137-1270), are believed to descend from Menelik 1 and thus King Solomon' (Messay, 1999: 76). The legend, first written down in the 14th century, relates how God's favour swung from Israel to Ethiopia who became the new elect of God. Orthodox Christianity came to the Axumite site in the 4th century and Islam came 3 centuries later. For most of the next 1400 years or so power was held by Amhara and Tigrayan 'warlords who created dynasties and built kingdoms and .. (Orthodox Christian) theologians who constructed dynastic legends and ideological precepts to validate kingly authority' (Gebru, 1991: xi). However, during the 16th century the territory came under threat from successive Muslim invasions from the east which nearly engulfed the Christian empire when Gagn, leading Danakil and Somali forces, invaded in 1529 (Messay: 54). Following the Muslim defeat in 1541 there was a 'vast expansion' of Oromo in the south and a 'deep infiltration' in the north involving the rise of an 'Oromo dynasty' which began to control the monarchs in Gonder during the Era of the Princes (1769 – 1855) when emperors 'became little more than puppets in the hands of powerful regional rulers' (Messay, 1999:55).

(ii) Tewodros and Yohannes and the scramble for Africa

During the second half of the nineteenth century the foundations of the modern Ethiopian state were laid by Emperors Tewodros¹¹, Yohannes (of Tigrayan origin)¹² and Menelik II¹³ through the restoration of the

¹⁰ This point emerged strongly in a recent presentation by Charlotte Harland at the University of Bath about a community in Zambia.

¹¹ Defeated by the British in 1868

Solomonic dynasty, although they were unable to prevent the Italians from taking the port of Massawa in 1885 and formally establishing the colony of Eritrea in 1890. A subsequent Italian advance to colonise Ethiopia was halted in 1896 when the Italian army was defeated at the Battle of Adwa. Thereafter Ethiopia remained an independent country apart from the short Italian occupation between 1937 and 1942.

(iii) Menelik II: the Battle of Adwa and the southern expansion

During the 1880s and 90s Emperor Menelik II consolidated an Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire through the conquest of Oromo and other non-Amhara people to the south of Gojjam and North Shewa (see Appendix Map 1). This southern expansion 'ensured access to exportable resources to buy the much needed firearms and counter the threat of colonisation.' (Messay: 47). One aim was to create the equivalent of a standing army by granting land to settlers in return for military service; the second was to create a local gentry through imperial grants of tax rights. 'Traditional chiefs and all those who supported the conquest were Ethiopianised in the sense that their power and status no longer depended on lineage rights, but on military and political services to the Ethiopian state' (*ibid*).

(iv) The rise and fall of Emperor Haile Selassie

Menelik became ill and in 1909 his grandson Lij Eyasu, aged 13, was declared his heir. In 1910 a council of regency was established. Menelik died in 1913. Lij Eyasu was deposed in 1916 accused of unstable behaviour and becoming a Muslim. He was replaced by his aunt Zewditu, and Ras Tafari, who was later to become Haile Selassie, was appointed regent and began to introduce modernising changes. From 1928 he was effectively the ruler of Ethiopia.

Messay argues that the long survival of the Abyssinian polity depended on a national ideology which resulted from a union of church and State, a socioeconomic order which depended on (responsible) clientelism, a 'fluctuating hierarchy' which allowed for social mobility, and a fighting spirit 'born of a social system which bluntly associated position and wealth with warlike success'. The bilateral nature of the descent system through both parents also favoured mobility since almost anyone could trace a relationship to a local noble which was likely to activate patronage (1999: 164). Messay also argues that Emperor Haile Selassie destroyed all these forces of survival during his attempt to establish an autocratic and hereditary¹⁴ monarchy, opening the way for the experiment with socialism.

'The favouritism of Haile Selassie and his obsession for absolute power had emptied all spheres of responsible and able people. Positions of power were filled with individuals imbued with careerism and cultivating submissiveness. Their eagerness for corrupt practices was their only competence. Naturally, the Ethiopians ceased to respect authority because those who exercised power did not inspire it. A general feeling of scorn filled the country, especially the young educated elites.' Messay 1999: 344

Haile Selassie 'headed a regime that was as impressive for its longevity as for its brutality, though, in comparison both to his predecessors and his successors the emperor appears magnanimous.' (Gebre 1991: xiii). In this regime there were few limits to the authority of the emperor; no opposition parties or independent newspapers were allowed and there was no accountability for the use of public resources. 'The famines that struck the country between the late 1950s and early 1980s are the most poignant and cruel manifestations of the agrarian crisis that imperial policies, in part, produced, but were never able to deal with.' (Gebre 1991: xiii). As his reign proceeded opposition increased. In the rural areas most resistance was individual and hidden, using 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1985), but there was intermittent collective popular protest reactive to state centralisation and modernisation. Peasants rebelled for a mixture of reasons (Gebre, 1991: xiv).

Centralisation undermined local and provincial fiscal and administrative privileges and disaffected landlords and overlords mobilised peasants tied to them in patron-client networks. Centralisation also increasingly affected household subsistence and was often experienced as social, cultural or national

¹² An enemy of Tewodros, crowned Emperor in 1872, involved in battles with Egyptians trying to extend their territory (1875-76); killed in battle with Sudanese in 1889.

¹³ An enemy of Yohannes conspiring for a while with the Egyptians, rising against Yohannes in the late 1880s; crowned Emperor in 1889.

¹⁴ Legalised in the 1931 Constitution

oppression to be resisted. During his reign Haile Selassie faced rebellions in Tigray, Gojjam, Bale (the Ogaden) and Eritrea, which had been re-integrated into Ethiopia in 1960. An attempted military coup in 1960 by his Imperial Guard, who wished to install his son as Emperor, inspired a generation of students. An increasingly radical student movement took hold in Addis Ababa University and high schools, and student unrest became a regular feature.

Marxism became popular among some of the intelligentsia. A drought in Wollo in 1972-73 caused a large famine which was covered up by the Imperial Government but exposed by a BBC documentary. The government was further weakened by urban disaffections as a result of rising oil prices and widespread military mutinies in different parts of the country. In this context the Derg, a committee of low-ranking military officers and enlisted men originally set up to investigate the soldiers' demands, deposed the Emperor in September 1974. (Map 2 in the Appendix shows the provincial boundaries during the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes).

(v) The Derg regime: experiments with socialism and civil war

The Derg was established in June 1974 with about 120 members. Major Mengistu Haile Mariam was elected as chairman. In the next months it ordered many arrests. Following the arrest of Haile Selassie the Derg renamed itself the Provisional Military Administrative Council¹⁵ and took control of the government. In May 1975 the monarchy was abolished and Marxist-Leninism proclaimed as the state ideology.

In 1975 a land reform ('land to the tiller') was introduced abolishing landlords and private ownership of land. Peasants, organised into Peasants' Associations through a *zemecha* campaign under which students were sent out into the countryside, were given access to State-owned land up to a maximum of 10 hectares. The period 1974 to 1977 was a period of acute conflict including labour strikes, urban unrest and military mutinies which were met with draconian responses; there was a heavy toll of civilian casualties through the 'white' and 'red' terrors including the killing of many intellectuals who had been in the vanguard of opposition to the old regime.

In 1975 the Ethiopia government declared war on the Eritrean People's Liberation Front after an attack on a US base. In 1976 a group of Tigrayans, including the current Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, left for Tigray to found the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. The government also fought a number of other smaller rebel groups. In 1977 the US, which had been Ethiopia's major arms and training supplier since 1953 declined to assist the Ethiopian government in the face of a series of Eritrean victories, so Mengistu turned to the Soviet Union who provided immediate military equipment and a unit of the Cuban airforce which were used to recover the position in Ethiopia and to repel an invasion of the Ogaden from Somalia.

By 1978 Colonel Mengistu was firmly in power although facing challenges from the EPLF and the TPLF in the north. For the next twelve years the Cold War context sustained the regime. While the Derg was supported militarily by the Soviet Union it also benefited from Western humanitarian aid ostensibly provided as famine relief for drought-afflicted areas. The ensuing years were devoted to the process of establishing a military socialist republic based on the model of the USSR; this entailed the establishment in 1984 of a vanguard single party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, a range of campaigns and mobilisations in the countryside, and the introduction of mechanisms for surplus appropriation and political control including the Agricultural Marketing Board, state farms, producer cooperatives, resettlement and villagisation (Clapham, 2002a). Also, as part of the Marxist-Leninist modernisation a number of accepted status distinctions came under ideological attack, including those related to class, gender, age and occupation, while religious activity was discouraged and controlled in various ways and many customary practices were suppressed. In 1987 the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was formally established under a new constitution.

Drought and famine hit the country in the mid-1980s in which up to 7 million may have died. The socialist production system led to a fall in agricultural output. Hundreds of thousands of people left the country as a result of political repression and economic failure, creating the beginnings of the Ethiopian diaspora. During early 1989 the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) routed a number of Ethiopian regiments

¹⁵ The Derg formally ruled until 1987 when it was replaced in a new Constitution by a National Shengo which, however, was subordinate to the Workers' Party of Ethiopia within a single-party Leninist state (Clapham, 2002b: xv). However the regime continued to be referred to as the Derg; no new members were added after 1974 and the number decreased, especially in the first few years due to killings and expulsions.

and later that year the Soviet Union and Cuba pulled out. On 21 May 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe and a week later the victorious troops of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front entered Addis Ababa.

(vi) Historical legacies

Ethiopian history has left a number of legacies which are relevant to the current situation. They include a history of competition for personal and autocratic power among Amhara and Tigrayans leaders, successions determined by military action, land access controlled by the government leadership, a culture of masculinity in which military values figure prominently, and hierarchies of exploitation and exclusion. 'Most power relations between social groups and categories have historically involved well-established hierarchies of status supported by norms and rules favouring superiors which are often violently enforced. Historic status discriminators include age, gender¹⁶ and class and various manifestations of ethnicity, clan, religion, occupation and race' (Bevan and Pankhurst, A.: 2006). During the long period of hierarchical rule an Ethiopian 'governmentality' developed involving ways of perceiving and thinking rooted in religion, ways of acting involving deferent and derogatory practices, and characteristic identities or 'ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents' (Dean 1999: 23).

More recent legacies include remarkably similar land privatisation / state nationalisation processes in which little account was taken of the rights of previous inhabitants, and increasing penetration of the peripheries by the centre. The Derg devised a reasonably coherent and Jacobin¹⁷ policy to deal with the spatial contradictions of Ethiopian statehood. A project of *encadrement*, incorporating people into structures of control was 'pursued with remarkable speed and ruthlessness' (Clapham, 2002a: 14). This resulted in a structure of local government, built on peasant associations, which incorporated at least the agricultural areas into a national administrative structure. Land reform led to the 'capture' of the peasantry in a way that subjected them increasingly to state control eventually through the single Leninist party the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.

As described above, the Derg introduced a new 'cultural repertoire' of equality particularly in relation to gender, age, occupation and religion. This did not, however, extend to pastoralists. During imperial times 'pastoralists (most of whom were also Muslim) were generally treated with the contempt reserved by representatives of a historic agricultural state for persons of no fixed abode (Clapham 2002a: 12). While the Derg would have liked to incorporate the pastoralist populations 'despite some efforts at sedentisation, they could not plausibly be settled, collectivised, or forced into benevolent modernity.(and) .. since they inhabited Ethiopia's lowland peripheries and most of them were Muslim they presented a security threat' (Clapham 2002a: 22). The Derg adopted two approaches. Continuing a process started during the imperial regime areas with agricultural potential were taken over for resettlement and cash crop cultivation alienating critical dry season refuges. Further 'they were managed politically by exploiting the internal divisions characteristic of pastoralist societies' (*ibid*).

Two further legacies from the Derg era are government aid dependency in the context of the strategic positioning of the Horn of Africa in the wider international political system and the military victory of the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front.

4. The EPRDF regime

On coming to power the EPRDF established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, which was replaced in 1995 by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). In 2004 the Ethiopian population was estimated at 70 million. There are more than 80 ethnic groups some with as few as 10,000 members. An estimated 16% live in urban areas.

¹⁶ Ethiopia's 35 million women 'represent a major under-used resource, and although they already do much of the country's work they tend to be trapped in low-productivity occupations, in part due to lower education levels; their potential is held back by poorer health, and repeated and dangerous pregnancies; and much of their time is consumed on low return tasks such as the gathering of water and fuel wood.' PASDEP 10

¹⁷ Similar to that of the French revolutionaries between 1791 and 1794.

(i) The Transitional Government of Ethiopia

The new government was dominated by the TPLF¹⁸ and 'closely reflected the distinctive attitudes which the movement had developed in the course of some fifteen years of insurgent warfare in Tigray, for most of which it had been effectively isolated not only from the outside world, but from the rest of Ethiopia' (Clapham, 2002a: 26). While the Derg had striven for national unity the TPLF associated such unity with repression and devised a formula aimed at respecting the identities and autonomy of the different peoples of Ethiopia. The 87 members of the Council of representatives were mostly chosen on the basis of ethnicity. One of the tasks of the interim government was the writing of a new constitution 'in which nationalities became the constitutive basis of the state' (op cit: 27).

(ii) The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ethnic federalism and decentralisation

Map 3 in the Appendix shows the 're-mapping' of Ethiopia (James *et al* 2002) into nine 'autonomous' states with theoretical¹⁹ rights to self-determination up to and including secession. Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples *Killil* were constituted as established regions while Afar, Somali, Gambella and Beneshangul Gumuz are characterised as 'emergent' regions. Harari is based on the holy Islamic city of Harar. The cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are self-governing administrations.

Table 1: The Established Regional States

	Popn nos	Popn %	Ethnicities	Religions
Tigray	1994 3,136,267	5.81%	Tigraway 94.98%	Orthodox Christians 95.5%
Language	Urban		Amhara 2.6%	Muslims 4.1%
Tigrayan	14.94%		Erob 0.7%	Catholics 0.4%
			Kunama 0.05%	
Amhara	1994 13,834,297	25.64%	Amhara 91.2%	Orthodox Christians 81.5%
Language	Urban 9.15%		Oromo 3.0%	Muslims 18.1%
Amharic			Agew 3.7%	Protestants 0.1%
			Kimant 1.2%	
Oromia	1994 18,732,525	34.72%	Oromo 85.0%	Muslims 44.3%
Language	Urban		Amhara 9.1%	Orthodox Christians 41.3%
Oromiffa	10.5%		Gurage 1.3%	Protestants 8.6%
			Other 4.6%	Traditional religions 4.2%
				Other 1.6%
SNNP	1994 10,377,028	19.23%	> 45 ethnic groups.	No information
Official language	Urban		Predominant languages:	
Amharic	6.8%		Sidamigna 18%	
			Guragigna 14%	
			etc	

Table 1 shows that the residents of 'Tigray' whose borders have been re-drawn to exclude desert areas, now in northern Afar, and include fertile and productive areas in the west which were formerly in Gonder, constitute only 5.81% of the population. Between them the remaining established regional states contain almost 80% of the population.

Tigray has been an economically marginalised area producing little for export until the incorporation of the western cash crop areas, subject to periodic famine and with a history of emigration rather than immigration thus sparing it 'the complex ethnic politics induced by population movements in many other areas of the country' (Clapham 2002a: 28). Clapham concludes that '(f)or a Tigray-based movement fighting against a centralised regime in Addis Ababa, some form of regional autonomy within Ethiopia was the only political programme that made any sense' (*ibid*).

With the coming of the EPRDF regime Amharas not only lost central political power, but also, 'accustomed

¹⁸ In May 1991 it also included the Amhara National Democratic Movement and the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation and other partners were soon added, including the Oromo Liberation Front, which, however, left in 1992 and tried to establish itself as a guerrilla insurgency.

¹⁹ In practice, the promised "self-determination, up to and including secession" amounted only to the exercise of local self-government in alliance with the EPRDF' (Clapham, 2002a: 29).

to regard being Amhara as virtually coterminous with being Ethiopian' have become just one identity among many. Furthermore, the Amhara region is one of poorest, least developed and most environmentally degraded parts of the country (op.cit: 29), although it has recently been claimed that the state has immense potential for irrigation, hydroelectric power and fishing (Government of Ethiopia website: www.ethiobar.net)

The Oromo are the largest and most centrally placed of the nationalities and the land of the regional State contains many potential surplus-producing and coffee-growing areas. Should they secede Ethiopia would disintegrate and the EPRDF has shown that it is determined this should not happen. 'Many thousands of Oromos suspected of sympathy with opposition movements were arrested' (Clapham, 2002a: 29).

The SNNP contains more than 45 ethnic groups who joined together to produce a viable regional state. However, while regional and sub-regional autonomy 'had much to offer the smaller nationalities' (Clapham 2002a: 28) it can also provide incentives for ethnic competition which is particularly problematic if different groups have become dispersed. For example the Guji have been involved in violent conflicts leading to deaths with both Gedeo and Borana. There is also a long-standing conflict zone within SNNP in the South Omo Zone. There are more than 12 linguistic groups in this zone each with their own language and tradition. The people are pastoralists, agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists all strongly influenced by pastoral values. While livestock brings the greatest status on average they get less than 35% of their dietary needs from livestock, having to meet the rest through hunting, gathering and farming. The groups have 'symbiotic trade relationships, marriage relationships, alliance relationships, special bond friend relationships known as *jala* and mutual co-operation particularly in times of crisis such as drought. Inter-ethnic relationships also manifest themselves in an adverse manner in the region.' (Tafesse and Bereket 2004: 518). The most important aspect of inter-group interaction in their long history has been conflict. Murder and cattle-raiding are part of the areas cultural heritage. Conflict over scarce resources resulting from high population and drought is another factor leading to conflict. Land alienation due to game park expansion and farm expansion has also led to increased competition for grazing land and water points. Proliferation of arms and access to military training as a result of political turbulence in neighbouring countries has made conflicts more destructive. Individual conflicts usually give rise to cycles of conflict at group level with raids and counter-raids, killing and abandonment of vital grazing areas and water points.

Table 2: Emerging Regional States

	Popn nos	Popn %	Ethnicities	Religions
Somali	1994 3,439,860 Urban 14.32%	6.38%	Somali 95.6% Oromo 2.25% Amhara 0.69% Somalians 0.63% Gurage 0.14%	Muslim 98.7% Orthodox Christians 0.9% Other 0.3%
Afar	1994 1,106,383 Urban 7.8%	2.05%	Afar 91.8% Amhara 4.5% Argoba 0.9% Tigraway 0.8% Oromo 0.7% Wolaita 0.5%	Muslims 96.0% Orthodox Christians 3.86% Protestants 0.09% Catholics + 0.02%
Beneshangul Gumuz	1994 460,459 Urban 7.8%	0.85%	Berta 26.0% Gumuz 23.4% Amhara 22.2% Oromo 12.8% Shinasha 6.9% Other 8.0%	No information
Gambella	1994 181,892 Urban	0.34%	Nuer 40% Anuak 27% Amhara 8% Oromo 6% Mezhenger 5.8% Keffa 4.1% Mocha 2% Tigraway 1.6% Others 5.5%	Protestants 44.0% Orthodox Christians 24.1% Traditional religion 10.3% Muslims 5.1% Catholics 3.2% Others 2.7%

Somali has a population that is larger than that of Tigray with roughly the same proportion living in urban areas (14%). Most people mainly earn a living from livestock, though they practice crop production as well. 96% of the population are of the same ethnic origin as the people of Somalia, though clan-based differences are important. 'It is a well known fact that pastoral areas suffer from prevalence of conflicts. ... The major factors behind the conflicts are pasture and water. These conflicts have caused much terror .. immense property damage and loss of human lives and made grazing areas inaccessible' (Abdullahi Haji 2004: 531). In the past these conflicts used to be between ethnic groups or clans but recently have also been among members of the same group, sometimes stirred up by 'dropouts' from the pastoral sector who have been unsuccessful in the urban sector. Conflicts are now more destructive due to the proliferation of machine guns.

The Afars were historically divided between the colonial states of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Until 1991 within Ethiopia the population was distributed among the provinces of Tigray, Wello and Western Harerghe. 'At best the Afar National Regional State is poignant testimony to the emptiness of past commitments, by both governments and aid agencies, to the development of Ethiopia. At worst, the region's historical neglect and relative underdevelopment implies a legacy of imperial exploitation and exclusion from whatever progress other parts of the country have had (Bryden 1996).' Since 1991 there have been sporadic outbreaks of political violence.

The Ethiopian state had little impact on people in Beneshangul Gumuz until the *zemecha* campaigning students arrived in 1975. The first Derg-appointed cadre administrator of Assosa escaped with armed followers to Sudan and set up what eventually became the Beni Shangul Peoples' Liberation Movement. In 1985 some 55,000 families affected by the famine in Tigray and Wello were re-settled in the hills near Assosa and many Bertha, who were Muslims, were forced to leave their land. In 1987 the Derg brought in soldiers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, mainly Dinka and Uduk, who treated the Bertha very badly (James 2002). In 1991 Assosa became the capital of the Benishangul and Gumuz Region.

Gambella was previously a part of the province of Illubabor and during the Derg local government was led by Nuer and Dinka. Under the EPRDF Gambella became a region with a locally-based Anywaa (Anuak) government though it lacked economic resources and political stability. For some years there has been conflict between the two major ethnic groups the Anywaa who are mainly agriculturalists and the Nuer who are mainly pastorals, involving many deaths and much material destruction. The populations of both ethnic groups straddle the border with Sudan and in the past both groups have shifted nationalities between Ethiopian and Sudanese depending on the situation (James 2002). Inter-ethnic conflict in Gambella has a long history but the current violence and brutality is unprecedented: 'killings and massacres are conducted spontaneously at the communal level, by civilians against their own fellow civilians' (Friends of Gambela' 2002: 541). The Friends recognise complex material and other interests and that the interest groups and their networks extend outside Gambella. They argue that the conflict is fuelled by competition to dominate the new political space 'created by ethnic federalism and the decentralisation project that followed. Who should control the regional government lies at the heart of the competition' (*ibid*). Human Rights Watch reported in 2005 that following a massacre of 200 Anuak in December 2003 the Ethiopian military 'has committed widespread murder, rape and torture against the Anuak people'. The military was responding to attacks by armed Anuak groups on people from the highlands 're-settled' during the Derg period. Unrest in the Region continues.

The western frontier region of Ethiopia is full of displaced people, including the Uduk. 'Like other displaced communities, they have found that assistance has been forthcoming only as a result of being securely under one form or other of local patronage, sometimes literally saluting one flag rather than another' (James, 2002: 272). James casts further light on the discontinuity by describing what happened in a number of border towns. '(O)ne set of people may flee, to be replaced by another, while a takeover may mean many different things to different people, and to the rhetoric of warring parties. There is no normal continuity in the history of such a place, and no normal social reality. These towns were set against their rural hinterlands in new ways: people from the countryside were co-opted into armed movements, to help attack and defend garrisons, or they fled elsewhere, to rival garrisons or to the large agglomerations of the refugee camps, which as often as not were under the patronage of an embattled regime or opposition movement.' (op cit: 273)

There are three predominantly urban regions, one, Harari, characterised as a regional state, while the other two, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are administrative regions. Harari is a tiny region which contains the

ancient city of Harar. The official language is Harari even though only 7.1% of the population is of Harari origin. Addis Ababa, which is located within Oromia region has been the capital of Ethiopia since the early 20th century. A noticeable feature is the high proportion of Gurages among the population²⁰. In the May 2005 national election the EPRDF did not win one seat in Addis Ababa. Dire Dawa is a commercial and industrial centre located on the Addis Ababa – Djibouti railway which was established in 1902. Manufactures include processed meat, vegetable oil, textiles and cement.

Table 3: Predominantly Urban States / Administrative Regions

	Popn nos	Popn %	Ethnicities	Religions
Harari	1994 131,139 Urban 58.24%	0.24%	Oromo 52.3% Amhara 32.6% Harari 7.1% Gurage 3.2% Official language Harari	Muslims 60.3% Orthodox Christians 38.2% Protestants 0.9% Catholics 0.55% Others 0.1%
Addis Ababa	1994 2.3 million Rural 1.2%	4.26%	Amhara 48.3% Oromo 19.2% Gurage 17.5% Tigray 7.6% Others 7.4%	Orthodox Christian 82.0% Muslims 12.7% Protestants 3.9% Catholics 0.8% Others 0.6%
Dire Dawa	1994 251,864 Urban 68.76%	0.47%	Oromo 48% Amhara 27.7% Somali 13.9% Gurage 4.5% Others 5.9%	Muslims 63.25% Orthodox Christians 34.5% Protestants 1.5% Catholics 0.7% Other 0.1%

(iii) The EPRDF and the project of encadrement

The EPRDF has taken the encadrement process even further than the Derg. Peasant associations, renamed *kebele* are bigger units than under the Derg, but within them smaller structures have been set up, known for example as *mengistawi buden* in Amhara areas and *gare, got* and *cell* in Oromo areas. In some places the lowest level of organisation with its own leader is 10 households. *Wereda* and *kebele*²¹ leaders try to use these structures to mobilise people for community work and surveillance, although our in-depth research in four rural communities has shown some local resistance. As with the Derg political structures of control are based on a single party system directed from above. Power resources include control of land and other government resource allocation and mobilisation through campaigns, meetings, direct orders and collective labour. Local government leaders provide permissions to travel and letters for health care and impose fines, more or less successfully, for such things as failing to participate in collective labour, or send children to school, and have powers to imprison people for a variety of offences. The federal government controls the electronic media and the press.

(iv) Public sector, private sector and party sector

Under the Derg all business was state-owned and managed. The EPRDF came under early pressure from the international financial institutions and country donors to privatise but this has been very slow and not resulted in the free market envisaged in neo-liberal discourses. More than 200 state-owned enterprises have yet to be privatised and fewer than 35 foreign firms are active (Index of Freedom 2006). A number of large businesses have been established by Alamoudi, one of the richest men in the world, who is of mixed Saudia Arabian and Ethiopian nationality and a supporter of the EPRDF²². Many other businesses are owned by companies related to the TPLF in a range of ways, notably through the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) which is legally a non-governmental public charity but run by, and in the interests of, the TPLF (Oromia Speaks). The writer of the article which appears on the OLF website

²⁰ The Gurage are a small business-oriented group whose heartland is in the SNNP Region who have settled throughout the country.

²¹ There are over

²² Sheik Alamoudi began investing in Ethiopia in 1992 and now controls businesses in a range of sectors Trans National Airways, MIDROC gold, MIDROC Elflora, MIDROC Kopsi, MIDROC MBI, MIDROC Real Estate, MIDROC Department Store, the Sheraton.

also claims that there are a number of legally private companies owned by high-ranking TPLF members.

(v) Class and status inequalities

Despite the socialist repertoire introduced by the Derg inequalities related to gender and age are still ubiquitous, although they are constructed in different ways within different cultures, and, as our in-depth research shows, are adapting to some challenges. There is also an important occupation hierarchy.

'Throughout Ethiopia there are minority groups of craftworkers and hunters that are excluded from mainstream society. The marginalisation of these groups is not a new or localised phenomenon. It occurs in the north and the south, in towns and in the countryside, in the past and in the present. ..it is so widespread that it has been described as a 'pan-Ethiopian cultural trait' (Levine 1974: 56). (Pankhurst, A. 2001: 1)

Ethiopia's many local communities are differentially constructed in terms of religion and ethnicity, and where they exist, clans. Our four in-depth rural research communities show considerably variety. Inhabitants of the site in Gojjam, Amhara region, are almost completely Amhara and Orthodox Christian but with a small pocket of the descendants of 'slaves' brought from the south during the imperial regime and a few Muslims in the urban section. A second site in Amhara region situated on the escarpment and adjacent to Afar region contains a mix of Argobbans (about 60%) and Amhara with a slightly higher proportion of Muslims since some Amhara have converted. One Oromia site is almost completely Oromo and Muslim, except for a handful of residents Amharas who are non-practising Orthodox Christians and an influx of seasonal wage labour from Amhara region. The second Oromia site is a melange of ethnicities and religions with a majority of Oromo but also considerable proportions from Tigray, Amhara and SNNP regions. Muslims are in the majority but there are also Orthodox Christians, Catholics and adherents of a range of small Protestant sects. Among the Oromo in both Oromia sites clan structures are still of some importance, being particularly relevant for the constitution of political factions.

(vi) International aid

The EPRDF regime has been dependent on aid to meet the food security needs of the population and aid and debt relief to finance its development and social policy programme, and arguably to stay in power. It has received support in its military adventures in Eritrea and Somalia from Russia and the US.

(vii) Cross-border war and conflict

The regime has been involved in cross-border conflicts in Eritrea and Somalia. After a UN-controlled referendum an independent Eritrean state was declared in 1993. However increasing border disputes and skirmishes led to the outbreak of war in June 1998. The war continued until June 2000 with an estimated 150,000 deaths. A UN force was put in the field while an independent boundary commission considered the matter. In April 2002 while accepting most of the conclusions of the commission both countries claimed Badme; in 2003 the commission judged that Badme should be in Eritrea which was not acceptable to the Ethiopians. In October 2005 Eritrea – frustrated by Ethiopian refusal to comply with the ruling of the border commission began taking measures to force action. There are frequent rumours that the war is about to re-start.

The Ethiopian military has also been involved in Somalia, sending forces in on a number of occasions, most recently to support the US-supported government in Baidoa under threat from Islamic fundamentalists based in Mogadishu. In August 2006 it was estimated that there were around 25,000 troops on the Ethiopia-Somalia border. The Eritrean government has supplied arms to the Islamists (Economist 11 October 2006).

(viii) Internal dissent

There are a number of liberation fronts, the most prominent being the Oromo Liberation Front which occasionally claims responsibility for small bomb attacks. There are pockets of insecurity throughout the country which the government tries to keep under control through the use of the military²³ and local

²³ The Ethiopian National Defence Force has approximately 100,000 making it one of the largest military forces in Africa. It is allegedly dominated by Tigrayans (Loukeris 2001). Since the early 1990s the ENDF has been in transition from a rebel force to a professional military organisation with the aid of the US and other countries.

militias. 'For several years it has been clear that urban dwellers have been deeply alienated from the regime' Clapham 2005. In 2001 there was some dissension within the TPLF culminating in a crisis and vote which was marginally won by Meles 'reforming group', following which a number of people were arrested for corruption related to TPLF businesses. Clapham claims that Meles' power base within Tigray is now shaky.

The EPRDF 'opened Ethiopia up, in principle at least, to multi-party competition, and elections of a kind were held in 1992 for regional assemblies, in 1994 for a constituent assembly, and in 1995 for regional and federal assemblies established under the constitution of the new Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia' (Clapham 2002b: xv1) The main opposition parties boycotted all these elections.

The federal elections in 2000 were contested by a number of serious opposition parties including the All Amhara People's Organisation and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition and by a series of locally-based parties (*ibid*). The EPRDF won nearly all the seats while the Ethiopian Human Rights Council announced that 'the May 2000 general election was neither free nor fair'²⁴ (quoted in *ibid*). It seemed like the 2005 elections were going to be different. In addition to a number of smaller parties two serious opposition parties emerged: the CUD, a coalition of parties appealing to a sense of 'Ethiopian' nationality and the UEDF which appealed to those nationalities, particularly the Oromo, who felt that EPRDF had not delivered on its promises. There were some pre-election debates in the national media and demonstrations in favour of each party and '(o)n the whole the elections were conducted with a level of fairness and openness completely unprecedented in Ethiopian history.' There was a 90% turnout. Clapham attributes this to pressure from donors and the government's 'supreme confidence' that it could not lose. However the official results of the election were 'deeply affected by fraud' so that it is impossible to know what the real results might have been. Officially the EPRDF won 327 seats, the CUD 109, the UEDF 52 and others 58.

'The government's attitude towards dissent has always been brutal and alienating, except where the need to placate donor communities has induced restraint' (*ibid*). Clapham quotes the example of the massacre in Awassa in 2002 when government forces opened fire with machine guns on a peaceful demonstration against a proposed change in the status of the municipality which had been pushed through without any consultation. There was no apology or investigation and EPRDF officials who criticised the action were sacked. This brutality was repeated in the aftermath of the election with a number of incidents in which people were shot in Addis Ababa and other towns. Thousands of people were arrested and imprisoned, including the leaders of the CUD and a number of journalists who have been charged with treason.

5. In/security outcomes during EPRDF rule

In this section data on outcomes measured or described at macro, regional and community levels are presented

(i) Macro data

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2005 GDP per capita (US\$2003) was calculated as \$97 giving Ethiopia a ranking of 153 out of 154 countries. Using a measure of GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) adjusted to take account of the cost of a basket of common items across different countries Ethiopia (2003 PPP US\$716) was ranked 148th out of 154 countries. On the Human Development Index Ethiopia ranked 170 out of 177 countries and on the Human Poverty Index 92 out of 95 (World Bank, 2005: 7-8). In 2000 31 million people (44% of population) were estimated as living below a national poverty line equivalent to 45 US cents per day. Consumption distribution is relatively equal with a Gini coefficient of 0.29; only 16 out of 126 countries had a lower coefficient.

More than 15% of children died before their 5th birthday and 47% of children were malnourished. Depending on the rainfall between 6 and 13 million people have been at risk of starvation in recent years. 'There is also extreme vulnerability, with consumption rising and falling dramatically from year to year as the result of drought, ill health or other family shocks. As a result many families who are not currently poor at constant risk of falling into extreme poverty and can never accumulate enough assets to break out of

²⁴ See Pausewang *et al* (2002) for a description of the elections of 2000 and 2001 which is critical of how far the regime has fallen short of the democratic hopes which it originally raised.

poverty' (PASDEP: 4). 48 million people do not have access to clean water and only 17% have access to electricity.

Table 4: Poverty and Wealth: 1995 and 1999

		1995 % households	1999 % households
National	P0 Head count	46	44
	P1 Depth ¹	13	12
	P2 Severity ²	5	5
Rural	P0 Head count	47	45
	P1 Depth	13	12
	P2 Severity	5	5
Urban	P0 Head count	33	37
	P1 Depth	10	10
	P2 Severity	4	4

¹Poverty gap

²Poverty gap squared

Source: World Bank 2005:14

Table 1 suggests that while the proportions of households in poverty in rural areas declined between 1995 and 1999 the proportion in urban areas increased. However consumption poverty measures vary with seasonality and with annual rainfall so the figures must be interpreted with caution. Other evidence suggests this the increase in urban poverty was related to an increase in inequality (WB 2005:18). 16.2% of the population lived in urban areas in 2006.

Illness incidents are both widespread and frequent in Ethiopia and a recent household survey suggests that their prevalence is increasing over time. (World Bank 2005). In 1995 18.1% of household heads reported being sick in the previous 2 months; in 1999 it was 27.2%.

Table 5: Self reported incidence of health problems during the last two months

	1995 %	2000 %
National	18.1	27.2
Rural	18.8	28.4
Urban	14.0	19.5
Male	17.8	25.9
Female	19.8	28.4

World Bank 2005: 177

Source: Welfare Monitoring Surveys 1995 & 2000

Hospital statistics of the top 10 reasons for outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and hospital deaths show the most important to be malaria, TB, pneumonia and other respiratory infections, accidents, abortion, pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium and gastric problems and dysentery. However Ethiopia has only 116 hospitals and most people cannot afford to use them. Estimates of malaria cases have increased from 1.1 million in 1995 to 4 million in 2003 with an estimated 111,000 deaths. The 2005 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey estimates that in the last two weeks 13% of children under 5 suffered from Acute Respiratory Illness, 19% from fever and 18% from diarrhoea.

Table 6: Deaths and malnutrition

	1967-70	1980	1990	1998	2000	2004	2005
Life expectancy at birth	39			43	42	43	
Infant mortality/1000 ¹		155		107	116	110	97
Under 5 mortality	239		204		176	166	
Maternal mortality							871
Under 5 malnutrition			1989-94	47.7%	2000-03	47.2% ²	

¹live births ²WDR 2006

Life expectancy estimates show a very small improvement compared with the late 1960s. Ethiopia's

maternal and under-5 mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Life expectancy estimates are affected by HIV/AIDS projections. The estimated prevalence in 2003 was 4.4%, people living with AIDS estimated at 1.5 million and deaths at 120,000. Ethiopia has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world and the population is susceptible to both long-term and transient malnutrition. Between the early 1990s and the early 2000s there was no change in the estimated proportion of under-5s suffering from malnutrition which was almost half of them.

Table 7: Literacy and Education

	1994-5	1995-6	2000 - 1	2003	2004	2005
Literacy		25.8	29.2		37.9 ¹	
Gross primary enrolment ²	24.1	32.0	57.4 ³	73	77	79
Net primary enrolment	17.8	23.4	48.8			
Primary completion			37	50	51	40
Gross enrolment secondary			18	25	28	

¹Rural 30.9%; Urban 74.2%; Male 49.9%; Female 26.6%; ²Grades 1-8; ³Males 67.3%; Females 47%

There is considerable gender bias: for example in 2000 girls in rural areas were 11.6 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in school compared with boys.

(ii) Regional data

This section contains some data by region. However not much faith can be placed in the data for Somali and Afar since they are regions with large pastoralist populations about which there is little statistical information (World Bank 2005:27). Around 10 million semi-nomadic people depend primarily on grazing herds of cattle, camels and goats concentrated mostly in the dry lowlands of Afar and Somali, but also to be found the south of Oromia and SNNP Regions and near the western borders. Pastoralists face many risks: drought, loss of herds, fragmented markets, and violence linked to land and water access and as a way of replenishing stock.

'There is little statistical information on pastoralists, but it is commonly held that that pastoralists tend to be poorer and more food insecure than their highland, humid and sub-humid counterparts, to be less literate, to enjoy less access to public infrastructure and services and to depend disproportionately on food aid.' (World Bank 2005: 27).

'Human development indicators and poverty among this group are uniformly worse than elsewhere in the country.' (PASDEP²⁵ 2006: 14)

Table 8: Poverty by Region

	Popn	% of popn	Poverty rate	
			1995 %	1999 %
Tigray	4,335,000	5.77	45	49
Amhara	19,120,000	25.47	45	36
Oromia	26,553,000	35.37	28	32
SNNP	14,902,000	19.85	49	48
Somali	4,329,000	5.77	08	15
Afar	1,389,000	1.85	20	43
Beneshangul Gumuz	625,000	0.83	49	54
Gambella	247,000	0.33	35	66
Harari	196,000	0.26	25	29
Addis Ababa	2,973,000	3.96	34	41
Dire Dawa	398,000	0.53	47	49
Total	75,067,000	100	38	38

World Bank 2005: author's own calculations using HICES data.

²⁵ Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty; Ethiopia's second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

As Table 8 shows most consumption-poor households live in the four large regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP) and Addis Ababa (85% of the population of the country). However currently the highest proportions of consumption-poor households are likely to be found in Somali (where there has been a drought), Afar, Beneshangul Gumuz and Gambella where there is insecurity and conflict in which measurement is unlikely to take place. Table 9 shows the extent to which starvation varies as a result both of annual rainfall and of where actually it falls or does not fall.

Table 9: Population in need of food aid by region

	More than 65% of population in need (no of sites)						
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006*
Tigray	2			18	3		
Amhara	1	1	1	10			1
Oromia	6	2	4	17	6	2	2
SNNP	2	1		1			
Somali	5	1	6	12	9	6	7
Afar	5		1	14	2	3	
Beneshangul Gumuz				1			
Gambella	1		1	2	1	1	
Total	22	5	13	75	21	12	10

* a different measure – tons of food?

Table 10: Education by region

	Students enrolled in primary and secondary schools			
	2003 – 2004		2004 – 2005	
	Nos	% popn	Nos	% popn
Tigray	710,177	16.38	819,285	18.90
Amhara	2,330,133	12.19	2,965,364	15.51
Oromia	3,914,109	14.74	4,868,381	18.33
SNNP	1,202,588	14.81	2,447,324	16.42
Somali	130,276	3.01	201,150	4.65
Afar	38,669	2.78	46,175	3.32
Beneshangul Gumuz	129,080	20.65	142,696	22.83
Gambella	50,243	20.34	56,099	22.71
Harari	33,504	17.09	30,881	15.76
Addis Ababa	487,773	16.41	488,810	16.44
Dire Dawa	48581	12.21	51,564	12.96
Total	10,074,073	13.42	12,117,729	16.14

The figures in Table 10 have been calculated in the absence of officially provided calculations. The meaning of the ' % of population' in school depends on the age structure of the population. In urban areas the proportion of young people seeking education is smaller than in rural areas, while a higher proportion of those eligible attend in urban areas. The important aspects the figures show are the low attendance in Somali and Afar regions, and the considerable expansion that occurred between 2003/4 and 2004/5 as a result of the donor/government investment.

(iii) Community outcomes

Out of an initial and rapid analysis of our rural case study data we came to the following conclusions in relation to household and human poverty (Bevan and Pankhurst 2006).

Household poverty

While there are no large landlords there are consequential inequalities in access to land (most notably in Dinki), ownership of livestock (most importantly oxen), and household asset ownership. Female-headed households are not much worse off in the Oromia sites, though they are in the Amhara sites. In all sites younger men are worse off than older men. In the Oromia sites old men are wealthiest on average, while in the Amhara sites the wealthiest tend to be in their 40s and 50s. Ethnicity and/or clan membership play some role in the distribution of advantage and deprivation in all sites but Yetmen where these identity dimensions are not found.

Human poverty

Common problems are diseases, lack of medical treatment, inadequate food, shelter, clothing, housing, harmful physical environments, harmful work, and harmful social relations. These take slightly different forms depending on gender and age.

Babies are at risk if their mothers are sick or overworked during or after pregnancy, and if they die. They are also at risk from disease which may be related to unclean water, poor sanitation, and starvation. Problems also result from lack of clothes, vaccination and medical treatment. Poverty increases these risks considerably. It is likely that education of parents decreases them. The survey found male babies to be rather more at risk of chronic and acute illnesses than females.

Knee and roaming children face similar risks to babies, plus some additional natural and socially-created ones including violence. When harmed, they may lack access to resources for treatment and compensatory action. In the survey sample the main activity in the last month of around 8% of 3 to 6 year olds was either herding, childcare, or fetching wood or water.

Working/learning children also face similar risks. In addition they may be exploited by parents and other adults through too much work and/or work that is too hard. The main activity of 35% of boys and 38% of girls in the survey sample was work. Poor children suffer from work exploitation and exclusion from services much more than richer ones; females rather more than males. Both may be beaten by adults. Girls may also suffer as a result of circumcision, early marriage, rape, and inability to dress like their friends. The proportion of boys and girls of this age who were studying was not hugely different (45.7% compared with 40.5%).

Survey results showed that in the small group of disabled children under twelve, 11 out of 15 were male. There was a slight bias towards the treatment of males under 16. Almost 90% of under-12s have been vaccinated with no gender difference.

Adolescents and **very young adults** face common problems. In addition males and females in transition to full adulthood share some problems as a result of their position in the life cycle but gender differences also become very important. Young males often get involved in drinking, fighting and womanising as well as negotiating or quarrelling, usually with their fathers, over work, income and access to their own productive resources. Young women are at risk of rape from young and older men, usually heavily burdened with domestic work, and need to succeed in the marriage market.

Additional problems for **adult women** include problems related to pregnancy, childbirth and infancy, and maternal anxieties about the survival and prospering of children. Conflicts within and beyond the household can also be damaging. The former may involve violence from husbands, and sometimes sons. In the survey sample women between 16 and 70 had a slightly higher incidence of chronic illness than men.

Adult men face anxieties related to patriarchal responsibilities for feeding the family and protecting them in a potentially violent context. A slightly higher proportion of men than women in the survey sample suffered from a disability, some of these associated with army service.

Old people are less respected than they were; poor old people and those without relatives are vulnerable. The survey found the incidence of disabilities (33.3%) and chronic ill health (42.9%) is very high among males over 70, being a little less high for women.

6. The generation of insecurity and illfare

Ethiopia's current poverty is an outcome of a mix of a set of relationships, mechanisms, and processes considered here under three main headings: poverty traps, risks, and political economy and socio-cultural structures and dynamics.

(i) Poverty traps, cycles and ratchets

The government's second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, locally known as PASDEP²⁶, describes a number of poverty traps:

1. The low-risk low-return trap prevents peasants from investing in higher-return cash crops; because if they fail because of crop failure, price collapse, or failure of demand they will not have the food for their families nor the cash to buy it
2. Low levels of infrastructure result in underdeveloped markets, high transaction costs and coordination failures; the economy is trapped in a largely subsistence-oriented structure
3. Prices - intra-annual cereal price volatility is high
4. Early malnutrition affects long-term mental and physical development and economic status
5. Poverty and low education reproduce themselves

As a result 'Government efforts to accelerate progress as rapidly as possible – including a big push on education, expanding infrastructure, opening the economy, building institutions, and devolving administration – are like those of an athlete running uphill: extra efforts are required just to keep the pace' (PASDEP: 4).

(ii) Risks from socio-natural life processes

These problems are compounded by a set of socio-natural life processes which produce livelihood shocks and stresses, particularly climate and weather, diseases and pests, and rapid population growth.

Dependent on physical location crops and livestock can be affected by drought, frost, floods, wind, heat. These may affect large areas, smaller pockets or just a few households. The three greatest contributors to Ethiopia's human disease burden are acute respiratory illness, perinatal disease, and malaria (Geresu: 1996). About 75% of Ethiopians were estimated to live in malaria-infected woredas in 2000 (World Bank: 2003). Other widespread problems include TB, meningitis, and diarrhoea and vomiting particular among children. The HIV/AIDS infection rate rose from a low base in the mid-1980s to 4.4% in 2003 with 91% of infections affecting adults between 15 and 49. There are recent signs that the increase may be levelling off in urban areas where the estimated incidence fell from 13.4% in 1995 to 12.6% in 2003. In rural areas incidence was estimated at 0.8 per cent in 1995 and 2.6% in 2003. 'While awareness about the disease has increased and some change in behaviour has been observed over the past couple of years, HIV/AIDS continues to pose a significant threat to the government's development efforts and continued and concerted actions as well as strong leadership will be needed to prevent the HIV/AIDS epidemic from turning into a disaster.' (World Bank 2005: 32). Agriculture and livestock are often seriously affected by pests and diseases.

Ethiopia's rural livelihood systems are heavily dependent on child labour. Children normally start work at the age of 6 or 7 and earlier in households with male or female labour scarcity. In a context of high under-5 mortality rates and little wage labour the rational policy of an individual household is one of high fertility. Collectively this has led to rapid population growth, which in the context of land scarcity, particularly in the northern highlands has led to starvation plots and environmental degradation.

(iii) Internal structures, actions and dynamics: macro effects

Earlier evidence suggests that there has been little change during the EPRDF regime in GDP per capita, poverty incidence, risks of starvation, malnutrition, and life expectancy. The HDI has improved marginally which is associated with educational improvements, particularly since 2000. Also the donor/NGO/government food security system is now working quite efficiently such that famines and deaths on the scales that occurred during the imperial and Derg regimes are unlikely. What are the internal

²⁶ Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 2005 - 2010

generators of insecurity and illfare and the relative stasis of their incidence?

Already identified at regional levels are population displacements of pastoralists and others associated with the establishment of cash crop plantations and national parks and wildlife sanctuaries associated with the development of tourism, in some cases by international companies in search of profits with no interest in what happens to the displaced people. The recent development of agri-businesses exporting flowers to Europe has been accompanied by more displacements, while the re-settlement programme introduced in 2003 planned the re-location of more than 2 million people. Plans for the building of large dams, the extension of irrigation and inward investment in the PASDEP imply increases in development-induced displacement which, if past practices are continued, will not be well-handled in terms of compensation rights and opportunities.

Another set of insecurity generators relate to the government's attempts to stay in power which have been widely discussed above.

(iv) Internal structures, actions and dynamics: meso effects

These macro features play out differently in different ecological and cultural contexts; the niche which a community occupies in wider ecological, economic, political, social and cultural structures largely determines the ways in which local insecurity and illfare are generated. However internal structures, actions and dynamics also play a role.

In our four rural case studies we explored how the macro aspects already described play out at meso levels. The study showed that the most important power relationship in terms of the generation of household and human poverty involves poverty itself. While there are no great extremes of wealth in terms of ownership of land and other assets, income, consumption and life chances are unequally distributed. Destitute and very poor people are economically, politically, socially and culturally excluded and sometimes simultaneously exploited by richer people. Whether they be male or female, young or old, life is a struggle which is often lost or full of suffering as they fail to access the resources necessary to make a minimal living, while those who survive often fail to make a sufficient living to enable them to participate in local social life. There is a growing category of destitute people in all sites while occupational diversification and access to irrigation are related to increasing economic inequality and associated with incipient class formation.

Servants are often badly treated with no opportunities for redress.

Relations of exploitation and domination by men lie behind the heavy workloads of women; although it could be argued that in harsh rural conditions household survival and improvement require some self-exploitation. Customary marriage rules in the Oromo sites include parental arrangement of marriages, bridewealth, polygyny, widow inheritance, replacement of a dead wife with a sister, and allowing abduction. Amhara marriage rules allow for very early marriage, and divorce is frequent. Women are customarily expected to produce many children with small allowance for problems associated with pregnancy, childbirth and infancy. Customarily women have had no rights to land, although the socialist Derg regime established the formal right of women to access land, and this has been maintained and increasingly implemented under the EPRDF regime. Culturally females have been accorded a lower status and value than males, and male violence against women has been regarded as normal.

Adult women fall into two sub-categories: those living in a household with a husband and those who do not. Different women move more or less frequently between these two states. Relations between husbands and wives usually involve some labour exploitation, some exclusion from certain activities, domination in terms of authority and aggression expressed in violence or threats. However, particularly when men fulfil their side of the marriage bargain, many women accept these local cultural norms and some develop warm and loving relationships with their husbands. The economic poverty of a wife is usually linked with the economic poverty of her husband, except where he has more than one wife or partner or is absent, drunk or otherwise unable to perform expected male duties. On average women in female-headed households in the Oromia villages do not seem to be much poorer in terms of productive assets than those in male-headed households. This is not the case in the Amhara villages where the ratio of divorcees to widows is much higher than it is in the Oromia villages.

Child work often begins at a very early age in many cases being vital for household survival. Both adult men and women are in a position to exploit their male and female children, while violence or its threat is

important in maintaining relations of domination. The need for household labour often interferes with education and school attendance increases the work burden on other children and mothers. Currently children and youth of widely different ages attend school. Across the sites the average age of males in Grade 4 is 16 and of females 13. Stepchildren are often neglected or exploited by stepfathers and may be expelled from the household by incoming stepmothers. Some regard child work as a form of education. Children are reported by some as working more than they used to. Physical violence is still regarded by many as a necessary part of the socialisation of children in all sites, though adults report that in the past punishments were much harsher.

Relations between parents and youth often involve power struggles. Young workers are important as a source of labour and support in old age. In the context of land shortage older men are reluctant to divide their small holdings to share among their sons as old men without land have little power. As a result an increasing number of young men without access to sufficient land are unable to marry. While the older generation is still keen to arrange the marriages of their children contestation of parental choice is becoming more common.

Within communities elders were customarily powerful in community decision-making and through their roles in dispute resolution and, within the family, their power to bless and curse was effective. The Derg introduced a socialist system of government in the 1970s manned by local leaders who were usually in their forties. EPRDF cadres have been even younger and the status of the old has been in decline.

Relations of cultural, economic and/or social exclusion can underpin distributions of power resources among people of different ethnicities, religions, clans, occupational 'castes', and race ('slaves'). Different 'primordial' identities figure in all four community stratification systems. Exclusion makes people more vulnerable and consequently open to exploitative labour relations.

Community elites include those with greater wealth and those with influence arising from local informal or formal organisational positions and sometimes charisma. These include local dispute resolvers, kebele administration leaders and religious leaders. Customary elites gain power mainly on the basis of control of land and labour and greater livestock holdings, partly achieved through the management of social relations gradually built up by elderly men. Modern elites have gained their positions through wealth and control of trade and external links.

Government-people relations are complex and related to community and country histories. In all our sites we encountered the view that the current government is perceived as 'Tigrayan'. The government mode is viewed largely as one of domination. Kebele officials have considerable command power including the threat of removing land entitlements, approval of illegal land sales, taxation, the ability to fine and imprison, the power to mobilise people for community work, the signing of permits for people to leave the site, get medical treatment etc, and the registration of organisations such as *iddir* (burial societies). The new structures for mobilising and controlling people at lower levels have extended the reach of the state.

(v) Global and regional structures, actions and dynamics

Ethiopia's relationships with her neighbours have been a major cause of insecurity and illfare. The war with Eritrea brought death and injury to thousands and displacement to over a million, with knock-on effects for the families of the dead and injured soldiers. Military expenditure was high and associated with a cut back in foreign aid affecting development and welfare expenditures. In 2001 expenditure amounted to \$800 million constituting 12.6% of GDP Relations with the 'collapsed state' of Somalia have also involved expenditures and brought insecurity to the Somali Region of Ethiopia while relations with Sudan have impacted on the livelihoods and safety of the Ethiopian living on the western frontier.

Just as the Derg benefited from the country's strategic position in the Cold War so has the EPRDF regime benefited from the 'war on terror'. The main concern of the US has been to maintain regional stability in the face of potential threats from Islamic fundamentalists who have already committed acts of terrorism in the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998. The US has had close and supportive relations with Ethiopia since 1991 and found new bases for cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Both governments have been concerned about the rise of *al-Itihad*, a Somali Islamic organisation, and Washington has provided bilateral military assistance, training, and economic support funds as part of a growing security relationship which arguably has assisted the EPRDF regime in its efforts to maintain security at home.

The Ethiopia Eritrea war has been discussed at the UN Security Council following which the US government said it would no longer sell certain military vehicles to the Ethiopian government (Lyons : 8) . Lyons believes that past experience suggests that the new more critical engagement may well lead to greater intransigence. US policy is significantly shaped by 'the remarkable mobilisation of a large, relatively wealthy and well-organised Ethiopian diaspora'²⁷ (Lyons 2006). This is a diverse constituency including many who support the incumbent regime and many such as Oromos who are apprehensive of the CUD agenda. The most influential are harshly critical of EPRDF and equate compromise with the EPRDF as betrayal, reducing the room for manoeuvre for opposition leaders in Ethiopia. They have significant ties to members of Congress some of whom have been pressing the administration for a change in policy.

The activities of external religious organisations also have consequences for wellbeing. Orthodox Christians with relatives who convert to Protestantism are often excluded from burial societies and other key security institutions and social networks. Wehabi missionaries from Saudi Arabia have been building mosques and preaching stricter versions of Islam.

7. Ethiopia's welfare mix

(i) A three-tiered 'formal' macro welfare mix

Formal market and government services

Addis Ababa has an increasing number of private clinics, schools, colleges, which are used by expatriates and richer Ethiopians. For illnesses needing sophisticated treatment such people travel to hospitals in Nairobi, South Africa and Europe. Since 1963 public employees have been members of a social insurance scheme and since 1975 employees of government-owned enterprises have been covered. The insured person contributes 4% of basic salary and the employer contributes 6% for civilian employees and 16% for the military. The scheme provides old age benefits at 55, disability pensions, survivor pensions and sickness and maternity leave for up to three months. The government has mandated a minimum wage for all public and formal private employees (Index of Freedom 2006).

Formal welfare for informal security regimes

In line with the Millennium Development Goals the goal of formal welfare for informal security regimes has been productivist, focused on health, education and food security. While better health and education 'empower' people they also improve the quality of the labour force, while food aid has usually been provided in the form of food for work. Most of the resources to fund this formal welfare have come from donors who have also been involved in the design of service provision. Implementation has been through government, NGOs, and recently international private companies. However, as the outcomes data show provision has been patchy and inadequate.

Humanitarian relief

Donors, the World Food Programme and a number of international and local NGOs, including churches and other religious organisations are involved in organising and providing aid for people unable to work due to drought or communal violence, including refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).

Informal provision

A number of local institutions, organisations and networks are involved in the attempt to meet consumption, health and formal and informal education needs. These vary to some degree according to local livelihood system and culture and historical experiences. Key local people are involved at the interface between the supply of government-steered resources and services and local demand.

At all levels there are opportunities for illegality and corruption. In 2003 Transparency International gave Ethiopia a score of 2.5 out of 10 reporting that the country was 92nd on an index of 133 countries. In 2004 the score had fallen to 2.3. In a report on the Global Corruption Barometer 2005 (Transparency International) 42% of respondents said that corruption had increased a lot in the last 3 years, with 195

²⁷ 'Many productive and educated Ethiopians have left Ethiopia and currently are fleeing Ethiopia at an alarming rate.' Half of the Ethiopians who travelled abroad for training in the early 1980s did not return. (Institute of Migration website). More than a third of doctors left between 1980 and 1991.

saying it had increased a little. In response to the question has anyone in your household paid a bribe in the last year 30% of respondents replied affirmatively.

(ii) Internal actors

Government

Since 2000 Government policy has been set out in two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, prepared in consultation with donors, civil society, and NGOs, locally known as Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP 2000/1 – 2003/4) and Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP 2005-2010). In the 1990s and the SDPRP the core of development strategy was Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) with a particular focus on fertilisers, improved seeds and credit for farmers in grain surplus-producing areas. The main social protection instrument was food aid and also important were education and health and capacity building. The PASDEP follows on from the SDPRP with intensified sectoral programmes in health, education, HIV/AIDS and water-sanitation and adding a major focus on growth with emphasis on the commercialisation of agriculture and private sector and a scaling up of efforts to meet the MDGs.

Food aid: Many households in deficit areas have become dependent on food aid, some annually and some only in years of poor rainfall. The food aid system, which involves co-operation between government officials, donors and NGOs, has evolved and improved during the EPRDF regime recently being re-designed to distinguish between the chronically food insecure and the vulnerable. A 'productive safety net programme' involving food for work on community projects is to be regularly available for those living in chronic food insecurity estimated to be around 6 million (PASDEP 200: 51). The productive safety-net programme has two components: labour-intensive public works and direct support for labour-poor households. The remaining 10 million are vulnerable and likely to become food insecure in a short-term emergency situation. In addition the government has targeted to help resettle 2.2 million people over three years.

Health: The percentage of central govt expenditure allocated to health between 1993 and 2004 was 6% while expenditure allocated to defence over the same period was 9% (UNICEF website). In 2004 WHO reported that the health service was severely underfunded with a spend of less than \$5.6 per capita per year providing only 0.2 hospital beds per 1,000 population, while more than 50% of population were more than 10km from the nearest health facility usually in regions with poor transportation infrastructure. 67% of children were reportedly vaccinated against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus with a coverage of 86% in Tigray and 42% in Afar (WHO website). Antenatal coverage between 1996 and 2004 was reported as 27% and in only 6% of births was there a skilled attendant at delivery (UNICEF website).

Under PASDEP the government plans to continue its focus on poverty-related health conditions highlighting malaria, diarrhoea and health problems affecting mothers and children. 'Efforts will be concentrated in rural areas and on extending services outwards from static facilities to reach villages and households'. There are a long list of targets and capacity-building plans. The plan presents three scenarios which would involve increasing the present spend of US\$2.77 per capita per year to US\$5.10, US\$7.37 or, if MDG targets are to be met US\$13.70

Nutrition: During the Derg regime 'Ethiopia was recognised as an African centre of excellence in the area of nutrition policy, research and practice' (World Bank 1995: 162). However the early 1990s saw a decline in the attention paid to nutrition in policy debates and programmes and a braindrain of top professionals out of the country. Responsibilities were dispersed across three different agencies which 'prevented the formulation of, and agency ownership over, a coherent and comprehensive agenda aimed at reducing child malnutrition' (op cit: 163). The PASDEP provides considerable information about malnutrition but apart from a statement that 'targeted interventions are also envisaged in the areas of health and nutrition in rural areas' there appears to be no coherent nutrition policy.

Education: Considerably more central government expenditure was allocated to education than to health between 1993 and 2004 amounting to 16% of total expenditure (UNICEF website). As we have seen in the outcomes section there has been a considerable increase in primary school attendance in the last few years. PASDEP claims that enrolments have risen from 3.7 million in 1995/6 to 11.4 million in 2004/5. There has also been an expansion of Technical Vocational Education and Training institutions and a rapid expansion of university education. The rapid expansion has affected the quality of education at all levels. The

education goals of PASDEP are include the achievement of universal primary education by 2015, improved quality and access to Adult and Non-Formal Education to improve adult literacy.

Market

As described above there are is a growing number of formal private health and education organisations accessed by the elite and middle classes. There are also semi- and informal health services including pharmacies, 'traditional' medical practitioners of various kinds including herbalists, bonesetters, and 'witches' who may charge a fee in cash or just require 'a cup of coffee'. Places with 'holy water' provide another form of healing.

Community, kin, friends, neighbours and self-help

In our in-depth research we found that all the rural communities had social protection links with people in other communities, usually through marriage. There was some migration for begging and an example of a diaspora organisation contributing cash to every household in the community²⁸. Community members were often called upon to contribute labour or cash for the building or extension of government schools, in one case for a school in a neighbouring village which was not used by the community. Within all six rural and urban communities burial societies or *iddir* were very active, in some cases providing loans or advancing post-death payouts to allow people to pay for medical care. One site had an *iddir* for oxen. Clans were important potential sources of support in the two rural Oromo sites, while monthly religious feasting groups (*mehaber*) played a role for richer households among the Amhara. Destitute sick and disabled people may be helped by individuals or groups, sometimes on a rotating basis. Land entitlements provide a form of social protection for people unable to farm, particularly old people, sick people and women heading households who can sharecrop or rent out their land to those with oxen and seeds.

Wider blood and affinal kin, neighbour, friends and patrons provided complex and reciprocal networks of support which may be used for economic development, human development or social protection, while close family and household members are key in the sharing (or not) of household resources. Finally self-help is a very important element in community welfare mixes; in one site adolescents earned cash doing daily labour and used it to cover the costs of education. The first resort when illness strikes is often bed followed by self-medication. In times of famine males of all ages migrate. Other strategies include theft, which was common in two sites, and begging. Orthodox Christians, including poor ones, give alms regularly, while richer Muslims provide charity during important religious festivals, such as Ramadan. During times of household food scarcity male members often migrate to look for work or to beg. In some food-deficit communities whole families migrate for begging once their output has been consumed.

External actors

Donors:

The Government launched an aid harmonisation programme in 2002. This has involved the establishment of the Development Assistance Group Ethiopia²⁹, a common framework toward budget support and a Harmonisation Action Plan for harmonisation work done at national, sectoral and project levels. Aid levels are approximately \$1.9 billion a year which is more than a third of the government budget. During 2000-1 the main aid partners were IDA, USA and the EU. The bilateral share was 42% and over 25% went on emergency assistance. The African Development Bank, Canada, EC, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, UK and the World Bank were providing assistance in the form of budget support and planning to increase it, but as a result of the post-election events in 2005 donors undertook a joint assessment of political and economic conditions of development and suspended direct budget support. CIDA, DFID and the World Bank have developed a new approach of 'promoting basic services' (PBS): tightly monitored aid to more targeted programmes mainly at regional and district levels is to replace direct budget support. The Government, these three donors and Irish Aid are financing a two year operation. The World Bank assisted by other DAG members has prepared an interim Country Assistance Strategy for 2006/7 with the objective of

²⁸ Although some time later local government officials said it had been a loan and had to be repaid. This was successfully resisted.

²⁹ which has Thematic Working Groups on Education, Gender Equality, Governance, Health, Population and Nutrition, HIV/AIDS, Private Sector Development, Trade and Financial Sectors, Public Finance Management and Macroeconomic Issues, Rural Economic Development and Food Security, Monitoring and Evaluation Task Force, and Water.

supporting implementation of 'a wide-ranging programme of governance reform and consensus-building efforts among citizens and policy makers' (aidharmonisation.org). The EC, USAID and the WB are attempting harmonisation of the food sector policy and programmes.

USAID Ethiopia has provided humanitarian and development assistance for decades: for example providing \$352m worth of food aid (\$277.9m) and disaster assistance in 1985. Food aid has been provided annually since with values ranging from \$42million in 1997 to \$359.8 in 2003. Funding of development assistance began in 1991 (\$1.7m) and reached \$47.1 in 2004. Child Survival and Health funding was first provided in 1997 and up to 2004 a total of \$230m had been provided. Economic support funds of \$5.3 and \$5.9m were provided in 2003 and 2004. The Consolidated Financial Plan for 2004 – 2008 (not including food aid) has five strategic objectives: to increase the capacity to manage shocks (\$12.1m), to increase human capacity and human resilience (\$264.7m), to increase the capacity for good governance (\$15.8m), to increase market-led economic growth and resiliency (\$109.3m), and to co-ordinate and institutionalise knowledge management (\$2.5m).

NGOs and faith-based organisations:

Non-governmental relief and development organisations first came to Ethiopia in the early 20th century in the form of missionaries sent out by Protestant and Catholic churches. The history of international NGOs in Ethiopia starts with the drought-induced famine of 1973/4. Initially efforts focused on relief and saved millions of lives, particularly in the 1984/5 famine. Gradually they have become more involved in development and the number of NGOs, especially local ones, has been rising, the number reaching 500 in 2004 having doubled since 1998 (CRDA and DPCC 2004).

'Yet NGOs are considered 'gap fillers' in some quarters in Ethiopia. Control and bureaucratic requirements characterise the environment in which NGOs operate. Largely because of this the NGO sector remains very small compared to other countries in Africa.'

In fact the government has shown considerable hostility to NGOs both in their advocacy and service delivery roles.

International businesses: European donors in Ethiopia have generally provided funds for implementation or policies or projects either to government or to international and national NGOs. USAID also funds implementation through for-profit companies, for example John Snow Inc.

'Since 1978 John Snow Inc has provided high-quality public health management consulting, training, research, logistics, and technical support services to US government agencies and other funders' (John Snow Inc website). One of the projects is the Essential Services for Health in Ethiopia which focuses on support to reduce population growth, improve child survival, and reduce the transmission of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections. JSI coordinates the USAID cooperating Agencies working under ESHE. With subcontractor Abt Associates JSI works to improve the problems of under-funding and resource allocation within the health sector.' One aspect of the work is the provision of drugs and family planning supplies.

Diasporas and migrants: In 2003 Berhanu Nega, then director of the Ethiopian Economics Association³⁰, classified the diaspora into six groups according to their potential contribution to Ethiopia. Two were useless and harmful: the first profligate with money and the second with political aspirations equating any positive contribution to Ethiopia with support for the government. The third group of educated and experienced expatriates not wanting to return because of volatility could exchange ideas and experiences with NGOs in Ethiopia; for example young expatriates could have internships. The fourth group in European countries which offer a one-time payment if they return home for good could invest in Ethiopia and bring with them their strong work ethic. The fifth group in the business community around the world could act as a bridge between domestic and foreign businesses importing their entrepreneurial spirit and skills. The sixth group has a strong desire to return to Ethiopia during retirement or earlier; they often send remittances. The International Organisation of Migration has launched a website to provide information for Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia on travelling, establishing a business, resettling and finding jobs in Ethiopia.

There is also a regular stream of departures for the US under the Diversity Lottery Programme (DV) and to Saudi Arabia for domestic and manual labour. These migrants are usually young, and in the case of the DV

³⁰ Elected Mayor of Addis Ababa in the 2005 election but now in prison awaiting trial for treason.

often highly educated, and send regular remittances to their families.

8. Conclusions

(i) Ethiopia's in/security regime

The bulk of Ethiopia's residents get such security, human development and wellbeing as they manage to acquire through local informal security regimes more or less connected with macro social policy and economic development programmes. Rights are informal and are prone to vary according to age, gender, class, occupation and other local status markers. Food aid provides local government officials with a tool of political control as well as opportunities to benefit family and friends which are more or less seized. In some places people reluctant to send children to school because of the need for household labour are threatened with fines by officials who have been set targets. Health services are patchy and inadequate and often costly in terms of transport and drug costs. At the macro level aid funds have helped to keep the current regime in power. Social policy in this context is not the result of a political settlement between government and citizens, demand for it being led by an international development social movement rather than organised collective action by the insecure.

The second constituent of the in/security regime is a set of insecurity regimes crossing the western frontier to Sudan, and the Kenya, Somali, Djibouti and Eritrean borders and mostly populated by pastoralists. The Horn of Africa is a volatile region in which wars have produced many refugees and population movements which exacerbate or generate further conflicts and people living in Ethiopia's lowland border areas have been mobile across state boundaries. Key players in these insecurity regimes are competing local leaders, government, and humanitarian aid providers who often unwittingly contribute to the conflict. For example, writing before the 2003-04 crisis in Gambella Abraham argued. 'The conflict-displaced population in Ilea of Itang *woreda* need close follow up. As the conflict is a very sensitive issue, any food and non-food assistance should be targeted in a transparent manner or else the assistance itself might cause further conflict. This could be done by involving all stakeholders such as local and international NGOs, UN agencies and churches, as well as Anyuua and Nuer communities' (Abraham 2004: 539). In these areas insecurity and illfare are stably reproduced.

The third and smallest constituent of the in/security regime is formal and includes international market services as well as those provided by governments and formal businesses for their employees. The context for this is an international market for health and education services and an attempt to establish formal welfare regime conditions for the middle classes.

(ii) Stratification outcomes

The in/security framework contains the assumption that the different groups involved in the provision of social policy develop interests related to their social policy activities, over and above their other interests. It is interesting to compare the interests of the contributors to Ethiopia's in/security regime.

Government

Government benefits from the donor money earmarked for social policy and other aid which funds over a third of government expenditure. Improved services and livelihoods increase government legitimacy and the fungibility of funds means that increased expenditures can be made on non-social policy items. Government can also use food aid at local levels to reduce potential opposition. They have informed the donors that they will need US\$37 billion in aid if they are to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

Oppositions

Some members of opposition parties regard the continued donor financial support to Ethiopia as one of the main reasons for the survival of the EPRDF – and would like it to stop.

Local communities

Many people in local communities want better health and education services, but often do not appreciate the manner in which they are brought to them, particularly the sudden demands for cash and work

contributions and threats if children are not enrolled in school or are absent. People in our two deficit case study communities were ambivalent about food aid, wanting it when they were starving but expressing a preference for development aid to free them from the need for food aid. They also complained about its lateness and the fairness of the distribution.

NGOs

NGOs have a considerable interest in accessing donor social policy funds since these are one of their main sources of livelihood. PRSP processes have created a space for NGOs, particularly international ones, to engage in local advocacy with potential effects on their service provision role. NGOs are not accountable to local populations and it is difficult to find information about what they are actually doing and its outcomes.

Private for profit companies

Large international service providers have not been working in the Ethiopian context for long. Their interest has been to get donor and government-funded contracts. They also are not accountable to local populations and again it is difficult to get information. If there is market competition services may be delivered more efficiently than by their NGO counterparts. They may also be delivering a different kind of product.

European donors and the World Bank

European donors and the World Bank have recently achieved a major reform of the 'aid architecture' in Ethiopia and there has been a feeling that the PASDEP might mark the beginning of a structural change. These are the third health and education sector programmes and donors have invested considerable funds and technical assistance in their design.

Regional enemies

The government of Eritrea and Somali Islamists seeking government would like the donors to withdraw funding from the EPRDF regime, which would make it more vulnerable to attack from both frontiers

The US

USAID has tended to operate independently from the other donors although they have joined the Ethiopia DAG. The differences in rhetoric and approach reflect differences in home welfare regime structures and the relative importance of markets and governments in these. The US approach reflects a number of US interests. The main bulk of US assistance over the years has been aid in the form of grain which some have linked to the interests of US farmers. Foreign policy concerns, particularly the stability of the region and the threat of terrorism, seem to be more important than international development concerns.

(iii) Recent mobilisations

Government

The recent invasion of Somalia by Government forces aligns EPRDF and US interests. The Government has also co-operated with donors to secure PBS funds. It is not clear what political moves are being made within the TPLF.

Oppositions

In May 2006 six political parties and armed groups formed the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in a meeting in the Netherlands.

Local communities

In all four of our case study communities the Government lost the 2005 election. In all of them people listened to radio broadcasts in local languages from the Voice of America and Deutsch Welle and discussed issues among themselves. 'There is unanimous agreement on the calm determination and responsibility of voters throughout Ethiopia, and the patience and orderliness with which they waited and cast their votes' (Clapham 2005). Clapham claims that 'the transition in Ethiopia is already under way, and the concern of both Ethiopians and the international community should be to do whatever they can to make it as quick and peaceful as possible' (*ibid*).

European donors and the World Bank

This group has withdrawn budget support to show disapproval of the government's post-election actions but

hopes the scheme to Protect Basic Services will take forward their education and health service agendas.

Regional enemies

The Islamic Courts which took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 have extended their control over the centre and south of the country and in August 2006 were pushing north. The President in Baidoa is weak: some of his militia have defected and the government is deeply divided. Eritrea is apparently being used as a staging post for arms from Iran, Egypt and Libya. 'The US, which has forces in Djibouti is also seriously worried by these developments' (BBC website, August 12 2006).

The US

Following the 2005 election some observers believe that US policymakers became uncertain as to whether continued support of the incumbent regime is the best option to maintain regional stability. Meles' ability to serve as a reliable partner who can maintain order and contribute to global counter-terrorism agenda is increasingly under question. Many expect the end of Meles' rule is in sight, either as a result of a change within the ruling party or a violent attack. Donor funds are increasingly tied to conditions relating to democratisation, good governance and human rights and Bush has said the promotion of democracy is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. It is going to be difficult to persuade people that the Ethiopian Government has met these conditions. (Lyons 2006)

(iv) Power, social policy and development discourses

This exploration of Ethiopia's in/security regime has shown the importance of power structures, relations and dynamics in the construction and impact of social policy in development contexts. Similar analyses in other development contexts would come to the same general conclusion, while revealing the particular local interests and dynamics at play. International and country donor organisations have been reluctant to engage with either politics or cultures of governmentality, working with a Western and sanitised development discourse far removed from the empirical realities of countries like Ethiopia, where civil society is often uncivil, 'participation' usually means forced labour and other contributions, and citizens are more aptly described as subjects. This unrealistic rhetoric, itself part of the larger power scene, has frequently generated development research, policy and practice which serves interests other than development or poor people's wellbeing. The current crisis in Ethiopia has brought this home to a number of the in/security regime participants who are currently having to make decisions about what to do next.


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Appendix


Map 1



Map 2



Map 3



Acronyms

ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation	IOM	Institute of Migration
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
CIDA	Canada	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development, UK	OLF	Oromo People's Liberation Front
EC	European Community	PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to Eradicate Poverty
EFFORT	Endowment Fund For the Rehabilitation of Tigray	PBS	Protection of Basic Services
EPLF	Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front	SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
ESRC	Economics and Social Research Council, UK	TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
EU	European Union	TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	UEDF	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HDI	Human Development Index	UNICEF	United Nations
IDA	International Development Association	USAID	United States
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	WHO	World Health Organisation